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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1  PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Local government is often described as the cornerstone of democratic government and it is the 
level or sphere of government that is physically closest to the people.1 As a result, local 
government tends to have the most interaction with the citizens compared to other governments 
organised at higher levels. In many countries, local government renders essential public 
services that are needed for both human survival and economic development.2 These include 
the supply of water and electricity, refuse removal, the provision of sanitation and housing, the 
regulation of land use, and the provision of health services. In South Africa, the Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Constitution) does not only position local government 
at the centre of public service delivery, but also has broader developmental duties. For example, 
section 152 of the Constitution requires local government to: 
 
‘(a) to provide democratic and accountable government for local communities;  
 (b) to ensure the provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner;  
 (c) to promote social and economic development;  
(d) to promote a safe and healthy environment and;  
(e) to encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations in the 
matters of local   government.’3  
 
Section 153(a) of the Constitution further provides that ‘[a] municipality must structure and 
manage its administration and budgeting and planning process to give priority to the basic 
needs of the community and to promote the social and economic development of the 
community’.4 Thus, it is clear that local government in South Africa, currently constituted by 
257 municipalities, has a broader demanding developmental role that goes beyond mere public 
service delivery. 
 
Despite municipalities being constitutionally tasked with performing the abovementioned 
functions and developmental duties, their performance does not meet the constitutional, 
legislative, and policy intentions. The Minister of Cooperative Governance and Traditional 
Affairs (CoGTA) announced, during the 2018 CoGTA budget vote, that 87 municipalities were 
                                                          
1 Bekink B Principles of South African Local Government Law (2006) 16. 
2 Bekink (2006) 16. 
3 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 s152(1)(a)–(e). 
4 Constitution s153(a). 
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identified as dysfunctional, and required urgent intervention.5 He also revealed that only 7 per 
cent of the country’s 257 municipalities are functioning adequately, while 31 per cent of the 
municipalities are dysfunctional of which 11 of these municipalities are already under 
provincial administration in terms of section 139 of the Constitution.6 The Minister called for 
an aggressive turnaround of the country’s municipalities in order to cure the inability of 
municipalities to deliver services and to prevent any further negative impacts on economic 
development. 
 
The level of municipal debt, which is growing monthly across all municipal categories, is 
another indicator of the poor state of local government in South Africa. The Applied 
Constitutional Studies Laboratory established that municipal debt to the Electricity Supply 
Commission (ESKOM) has reached R17 billion, amounting to 20 per cent of ESKOM’s total 
annual revenue.7 Due to failures by municipalities to pay Eskom for bulk electricity supply, it 
is estimated that 7.5 million people in South Africa are facing possible electricity cuts.8 After 
examining the overall debt of local government, the National Treasury established that 
municipalities owed its creditors R50.9 billion as of 31 December 2018.9 The National 
Treasury attributed this growing culture of non-payment for bulk services provided by 
municipalities to a leadership problem within municipalities, in particular, the leadership’s 
failure to execute its legal mandate.10 This increase in debt has already resulted in certain 
municipalities becoming bankrupt and therefore, dysfunctional.11 Thus, the municipal 
leadership’s failure to execute its mandate to pay creditors timeously has placed many 
municipalities in vulnerable positions. In fact, the Auditor General of South Africa (AGSA) 
revealed that 31 per cent of municipalities have disclosed in their financial statements that they 
‘might not be able to continue operating’ because of their poor revenue and budget 
management.12 
                                                          
5 Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs ‘CoGTA Minister calls for the turnaround of all distressed 
municipalities and to go back to basics’ available at http://www.cogta.gov.za/?p=4490 (accessed 31 July 2018). 
6 Dentlinger L ‘Only 7% of SA’s 257 municipalities well-functioning’ available at 
https://ewn.co.za/2018/05/15/only-7-of-sa-s-257-municipalities-well-functioning (accessed 9 October 2018). 
7 Constitutional Applied Studies Laboratory ‘Public Finance Watch Research Brief: Issue 2’ (2018) 1. 
8 Constitutional Applied Studies Laboratory (2018) 1. 
9 National Treasury Local Government Revenue and Expenditure: First Quarter Local Government Section 71 
Report for the Period: 1 July 2018-30 September 2018 (2018) 1. 
10 National Treasury Consolidated General Report on the Local Government Audit Outcomes (2018) 1. 
11 Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs ‘Minister Mkhize emphasis the role of local government in 
the energy landscape’ available at http://www.cogta.gov.za/?p=3365 (accessed 6 August 2018). 
12 Auditor General of South Africa Consolidated General Report on the Local Government Audit Outcomes (2017) 
20. 
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Where municipalities are not delivering services, or not delivering quality services, the result 
has often been that members of the community take their frustrations to the streets in protest. 
Service delivery protests, most of which are violent, are thus a reflection of community 
frustration with these failures.13 The data provided for the years 2003 to 2018 illustrate that 
while the system of local government has been established with genuine intentions to positively 
affect democracy and to bring about social and economic delivery to the people, the system has 
not lived up to its expectations.14 It demonstrates that the well-developed institutions and 
legislation are not matched by responsive service delivery. 
 
The AGSA observed that the main reason why the state of local government is deteriorating is 
that accountability continues to fail at this lowest level of government.15 The AGSA found that 
2016/17 audit outcomes for local government regressed mainly due to a failure to uphold the 
principle of accountability. This is partially why, for instance, irregular expenditure increased 
from R16 212 billion for the year 2015/16 to R28 376 billion for the year 2016/17.16 
Communities and the businesses that municipalities serve feel the impact of accountability 
failures in municipalities directly. It further places pressure on the country’s overall finances, 
as the national and provincial government are forced to continuously rescue municipalities to 
keep them afloat.17 
 
The poor state of accountability in local government suggests that interventions that have been 
adopted thus far are either not working or are insufficient. This further confirms that, despite 
efforts being made to improve the local sphere of government, municipalities continue to be 
hindered by challenges including that the formal municipal accountability system is ineffective 
and inaccessible to many citizens.18 Thus, there is a need to explore alternative interventions 
or complementary interventions to ensure that local government delivers on its mandate. The 
                                                          
13 Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs ‘Back to basics: serving our communities better!’ available at 
http://www.cogta.gov.za/cgta_2016/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/The-Back-to-Basics-Approach-Concept-
Document.pdf (accessed 6 August 2018). 
14 Buccus I & Mathekga R ‘The Challenge of Local Government Structures in South Africa: Securing 
Community Participation’11 available at 
http://www.clearcontent.co.za/storage/files/prev_Challenge_of_local_govt_structures_in_SA.pdf (accessed 6 
August 2018). 
15 Auditor General of South Africa (2017) 13. 
16 Auditor General of South Africa (2017) 16. 
17 Auditor General of South Africa (2017) 20. 
18 Cooperative Governance & Traditional Affairs State of Local Government in South Africa: Overview Report 
(2009) 11 
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question is whether the implementation of the King IV Report on Corporate Governance (2016) 
will make a difference or change the state of accountability for the better. The Report is built 
on corporate governance principles such as ethical and effective leadership and corporate 
citizenship that have been traditionally applied in the private sector.19  
 
2  SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROBLEM 
The poor state of service delivery and governance challenges in local government can be 
attributed partially to accountability weaknesses in local government. These challenges 
manifest themselves in widespread corruption and resource wastage, which impedes 
municipalities from delivering essential quality services. Where a municipality fails to deliver 
public services, it results in a breach of its constitutional mandate but more importantly it 
directly affects the lives of people. Lives are lost, diseases proliferate, and living conditions 
deteriorate especially for marginalised members of society. The business community is not 
spared either as it depends on some municipal services for its operations. Violent service 
delivery protests are a common and frequent response to service delivery failures which 
protests threaten human life as well as both public and private property. It is therefore clear 
that if the poor state of accountability is not addressed, a local government capable of 
discharging its developmental duties that is envisaged in the constitutional, legal and policy 
framework, will never be realised.  
 
3  RESEARCH QUESTION 
 The above discussion has demonstrated that local government has not been living up to its 
potential and fulfilling its constitutional and developmental mandate. Service delivery 
continues to fail in most municipalities with adverse effects on citizens’ well-being and 
economic development. The discussion demonstrated that this failure can be attributed to a lack 
of accountability at local level. The question is what is the utility of the King IV Principles on 
Corporate Governance to improve the state of accountability in South African municipalities? 
This is the overarching question that this paper seeks to answer, by inter alia, discussing how 
the principles can be incorporated in local government. 
 
                                                          
19 Institute of Directors Southern Africa King IV: Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa (2016) 4. 
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4  ARGUMENT 
It is argued that service delivery failures, which are common challenges for South African 
municipalities, are unlikely to be resolved unless accountability is restored. This argument is 
informed by the fact that decentralisation is likely to deliver when local governments are 
accountable. Thus, while it is important to equip local government with a variety of powers, 
responsibilities, and resources, accountability will ultimately indicate whether local 
government will live up to its potential or not. It is further contended that the King IV Principles 
can be effective in arresting some of the accountability failures in municipalities if correctly 
incorporated at the local government level.  
 
5  LITERATURE SURVEY  
Local government is often known as the level of government that has the most significant 
contact with citizens.20 In most countries, it is the level or sphere of government that has the 
‘first point of contact between an individual and a governmental institution’.21 In South Africa, 
local government, its objectives, powers and responsibilities enjoy constitutional recognition. 
In this regard, Thornhill argues that municipalities should exercise these constitutional powers 
in a manner that maximises their impact on social development and economic growth and to 
democratise development.22 Thus, local government is responsible for making decisions about 
the provision of services for the betterment of communities, including the marginalised 
members of society.23 These decisions directly impact on the livelihoods of individual citizens 
and the operations of organisations and private businesses.24 It is thus important that 
municipalities are held accountable for such decision-making as a failure to do so could 
negatively impact socio-economic growth and service delivery in general. 
 
According to Napier, the expectation in democratic systems is that ward or constituency 
representatives and political parties, as well as constitutional and statutory structures, should, 
through a variety of mechanisms, including periodic elections, reports, and public participation 
                                                          
20 Chigwata T & De Visser J ‘Local Government in the 2013 Constitution of Zimbabwe: Defining the Boundaries 
of Local Autonomy’ (2017) 10(1) Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 153. 
21 Thornhill C ‘The Transformed Local Government System: Some Lessons’ (2008) 43 Journal of Public 
Administration 492. 
22 Thornhill (2008) 497. 
23 Masehela K, Mamogale M & Makhado R ‘Should Municipalities Account to the Legislature? Issues of 
Parliamentary Oversight and Service Delivery’ (2012) 47(1) Journal of Public Administration 345. 
24 Masehela K, Mamogale M & Makhado R (2012) 344. 
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processes, provide explanations or justifications for their actions or inaction to the public.25 
Accountability, at local level, can thus be defined as the duty to explain or answer for one’s 
conduct and being subjected to a constant monitoring process either by national and provincial 
governments, independent institutions, civil society, or communities at large.26 Accountability 
within local government is crucial to ensure the good stewardship of taxpayers’ money when 
municipalities exercise their powers and perform their duties.  
 
One of the constitutional mandates of local government is to ‘ensure the provision of services 
to communities in a sustainable manner’.27 Steytler and De Visser caution that the ‘unwise, 
inefficient, negligent or corrupt use of municipal funds seriously undermine a municipality’s 
ability to meet its constitutional mandates’.28 Effective controls over expenditure to ensure that 
municipal officials account for their actions or lack thereof are therefore necessary to ensure 
that public funds are spent appropriately and sustainably. Reddy and Sikhakane identify 
accountability tools, such as expenditure controls, as important tools for ensuring that public 
needs, legitimate demands, and entitlements are adequately addressed.29 
 
While vast literature on the importance of accountability in local government and how it can 
be promoted exist, no one has analysed the utility of the King IV Principles in improving the 
poor state of accountability in local government in South Africa. Reddy and Sikhakane wrote 
on the types of accountability and elaborated on how each of these concepts can be 
strengthened in municipalities as well as its benefits.30 Reddy and Sikhakane further distinguish 
between hierarchical accountability, professional accountability, legal accountability, and 
political accountability.31 Vyas-Doorgapersad and Ababio wrote on the illusion of ethics for 
good local governance in South Africa but restricted their argument to the Code of Conduct for 
Public Servants as issued by the Public Service Commission.32  
 
                                                          
25 Napier C ‘Accountability: An Assessment at the Local Government Sphere’ (2007) 42(4) Journal of Public 
Administration 378. 
26 Napier (2007) 376. 
27 Constitution s152(1)(b). 
28 Steytler & De Visser Local Government Law of South Africa (2017) 14–5. 
29 Sikhakene B & Reddy P ‘Public Accountability at the Local Government Sphere in South Africa’ (2011) 4 
African Journal of Public Affairs 86. 
30 Sikhakene & Reddy (2011) 86–89. 
31 Sikhakene & Reddy (2011) 86–89. 
32 See Vyas-Doorgapersad S & Ababio E ‘The Illusion of Ethics for Good Local Governance in South Africa’ 
(2010) 6 The Journal for Transdisciplinary Research in Southern Africa 411–427. 
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Some scholars have written on the importance of ethical leadership in local government. De 
Visser, for instance, argue that the Code of Conduct for Councillors is a tool that is available 
to hold councillors accountable and thereby improving the status of accountability in local 
government.33 He further claims that compliance with this Code would ensure that councillors 
act with integrity and it would indeed remedy the lack of responsiveness on the part of 
councillors towards their citizens and minimise corruption and maladministration involving 
councillors.34 De Visser’s contribution was however limited to a discussion of only one 
accountability mechanism namely, the Code of Conduct for Councillors. The analysis in the 
problem statement, however, suggests that the existing accountability mechanisms including 
codes of conduct are inefficient to render the desired outcome.  
 
Other scholars focus on how effective leadership can improve the state of accountability in 
local government. Hartley,35 Marsh,36  and Hickey37 opine that literature on management 
competencies of leaders have been dominated by discussions of generic frameworks but have 
not addressed the competencies needed for managing in a politically-led organisation where 
issues of accessibility of services, participation in decision-making, and greater responsiveness 
are imperative. These scholars focus on competencies such as intellectual and management 
competencies to ensure effective leadership in municipalities. Several scholars agree that the 
existing legislation on local government pertaining to the minimum competencies of municipal 
leaders adequately provides for effective leadership to be maintained in municipalities.38 The 
legislation, however, pays very little attention, if any, to the competency requirements for 
councillors to effectively do their job. It, therefore, becomes clear that despite the vast literature 
on accountability at the local level in South Africa, there remains many gaps that require 
attention. Even more so given that the state of accountability in municipalities remains poor. 
This paper, therefore, explores the utility of the King IV Report in improving the status of 
accountability. It is the first of its kind to undertake such an exploration.  
 
                                                          
33 De Visser ‘Local Accountability: Enforcing the Code of Conduct for Councillors’ (2006) 1. 
34 De Visser (2006) 2. 
35 See, Hartley J & Lawton A Leading Communities: Competencies for Effective Community Leadership (1998) 
54–54. 
36 See, Marsh M ‘Leadership and Leading: Leadership Challenges’ (2006) 36(4) American Review of Public 
Administration 382–384. 
37 See, Hickey G, Iles P & Macaulay M ‘Mapping the Ethics Network in English Local Government’ (2007) 19(1) 
Viesoji Politika ir Administravimas 7–15. 
38 Sibanda M ‘Control, Ethics and Accountability in the Financial Management Performance of Eastern Cape 
Municipalities’ (2017) 52(2) Journal of Public Administration 313; Oberholzer C & Diedericks J ‘Municipal 
Leadership Collectively Responsible’ (2013) 38(5) Journal of Public Administration 42. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/ 
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6  CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This study comprises of five chapters. Chapter 1 is the introductory chapter which provides the 
problem statement, the significance of the research problem, research question, argument, 
literature survey, chapter outline and the methodology of the study. Chapter 2 discusses why 
accountability is important in local government and how it can be promoted. Chapter 3 
examines the state of local government in South Africa particularly focusing on accountability 
mechanisms both in legislation and in practice. Chapter 4 analyses the selected King IV 
Principles and discusses how these principles can be operationalised in municipalities to 
improve accountability. Chapter 5 concludes with major findings and conclusions. 
 
7  METHODOLOGY 
This is a desktop-based study which will make use of both primary and secondary sources. The 
primary sources include the Constitution, various Acts of Parliament, by-laws, proclamations, 
regulations, bills, and statutes as well as case law. The secondary sources include the White 
Paper on Local Government of 1998, textbooks, chapters in books, journal articles, internet 
articles, newspaper articles, and conference speeches and press statements relevant to King IV, 
accountability, and local government in general.  
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/ 
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CHAPTER 2: ACCOUNTABILITY IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
1  INTRODUCTION 
In paragraph 1 of chapter 1, it was pointed out that local government in South Africa is failing 
to meet its service delivery and development responsibilities. The AGSA attributes this failure 
partially to accountability which continues to fail within municipalities.39 This chapter, 
therefore, seeks to understand why accountability is important for local government to function 
effectively. This entails establishing the expected outcomes of a functioning system of local 
government. If accountability is central to an effective functioning of local government, what 
are some of the ways in which it can be promoted in a decentralised system of government? 
The chapter briefly discusses the potential of decentralisation before examining the importance 
of accountability at a local level. Vertical and horizontal mechanisms of promoting 
accountability are then explored followed by the conclusion. 
 
2 WHY DO GOVERNMENTS DECENTRALISE? 
Decentralisation can be defined as the transfer of authority and responsibility for public 
functions from the central government to subordinate or quasi-independent government, 
organisations or the private sector.40 It is generally categorised into devolution, 
deconcentration, delegation, and privatisation.41 Within the first three categories, 
decentralisation can result in the diffusion of economic, fiscal, administrative and/or political 
powers or authority. Several countries, especially in the developing world42, have adopted 
decentralisation programmes to realise the benefits linked to democracy, development, and 
peace, among others. 43 This section will briefly discuss the potential of decentralisation to 
show what local governments can achieve if they are effective. 
 
2.1 Decentralisation and democracy 
The argument that democracy and decentralisation are inseparable  was raised over a century 
ago.44 Therefore, the argument raised here is not a new phenomenon.   
                                                          
39 Auditor General of South Africa (2017) 13. 
40 Litvack J, Seddon J & Others Decentralization Briefing Notes (1999) 2. 
41 See De Visser (2005) 17 for a further discussion on decentralisation. 
42 Over the past two decades, 80 per cent of all developing and transitioning countries have undertaken some 
form of decentralisation. See Crawford G & Hartmann C Decentralisation in Africa: A Pathway out of Poverty 
and Conflict? (2008) 7. 
43 See De Visser (2005), Litvack et al (1999), Heller (2001) and Shah & Thompson (2004). 
44 Widmalm S Decentralisation, Corruption and Social Capital: From India to the West  (2008) 36. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/ 
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 Decentralisation has the ability to promote political participation, democratic pluralism, 
accountability, and responsive governance.45 With regard to political participation, Article 25 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) provides that: ‘every 
citizen shall have the right and opportunity … to take part in the conduct of public affairs, 
directly or through freely chosen representatives’.46 As decentralisation brings the government 
closer to the people, political participation is strengthened at the grass-roots. In this way, 
decentralisation has the potential to establish an environment that is conducive for the 
establishment of new political spaces at a local level to strengthening citizenship. Citizenship 
is strengthened as members of the public are transformed from passive subjects into politically 
aware and educated citizens capable of engaging effectively with authorities at a local level.47 
In addition, citizenship is strengthened as it allows for the poor and marginalised who are not 
often well represented at the national level to influence decision-making at local level. 
Therefore, decentralisation deepens democracy. Democratic participation is therefore 
strengthened through decentralisation as it increases the voice of ordinary people in the affairs 
of a country.48 Shah and Thompson, however, note that where civic participation is lacking in 
local government, there is a greater risk that interest groups and local elites may capture local 
governments and direct resources towards their own priorities rather than towards the provision 
of public services and poverty alleviation.49 Therefore decentralisation also has the potential, 
through citizen participation, to strengthen accountability and minimise corruption at local 
level. However, decentralisation can fail where elected representatives do not engage in 
meaningful participation with interested stakeholders but merely adopt a check-box approach 
to participation, in order to make certain decisions whilst complying with procedural 
requirements. In this case, accountability is weakened and decentralisation is likely to fail. 
Therefore, decentralisation has the potential to deepen democracy where there is real political 
participation by the citizens, including marginalised members of the society.50 
 
                                                          
45 See De Visser (2005), Shah (2000), Litvack et al (1999). 
46 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 (1976) 999 UNTS 171 art 25. 
47 Siddle A Decentralisation in South African Local Government: A Critical Evaluation (unpublished PHD thesis, 
University of Western Cape, 2011) 43. 
48 World Bank (2001) 108. 
49 Shah & Thompson (2004) 23. 
50 United Cities and Local Governments ‘Key issues for local governments: Decentralisation’ available at 
http://www.uclg-decentralisation.org/sites/default/files/tripticdcal_eng_last.pdf (accessed 11 June 2019). 
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2.2 Decentralisation and development 
Decentralisation has the potential to promote development in many ways. According to 
Weimar ‘decentralisation is viewed as part of building a more viable, balanced state which can 
deliver goods and services and contribute to wealth creation or poverty reduction’.51 
Government can thus become more responsive when it is in closer proximity to its taxpayers. 
This further enhances allocative efficiency by matching the provision of public goods and 
services with citizens’ preferences which may not be possible under centralised governance.52 
Ojendal and Dellnas posit that where the state is positioned locally through decentralisation, it 
is made increasingly available.53 In this way, it becomes progressively exposed to demands 
made by broad segments of its population.54 Decentralisation thus increase responsiveness to 
citizens’ unique demands. Through matching resources according to the needs of diverse 
groups at local level, local interests and preferences are closely reflected in the delivery of 
public services.55 Therefore, by bringing government closer to the people, decentralisation 
provides a structural and institutionalised avenue through which the local community can exert 
influence in the formulation and implementation of developmental policies and the 
determination of their development in general.56  
 
2.3 Decentralisation and peace 
As decentralisation refers to the process where powers and responsibilities are transferred for 
public functions from the central government to subordinate or quasi-independent 
government57, decentralisation consequently leads to power sharing at vertical levels. 
Therefore, if what is contested is control over territory, decentralisation may contribute to 
peace-building. In this way, decentralisation presents members of a particular community with 
the opportunity to govern themselves through locally elected representatives. The consequence 
of this is that decentralisation accommodate diversity where local communities have the 
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opportunity to self-govern.58 Further, where peace already exists, decentralisation has the 
potential to sustain such peace. This is done through shared governance, where the concern is 
not who has power over whom, but rather how such powers can be exercised for the well-being 
of all people.59 In countries where the state had failed, such as Cambodia, Rwanda, Sudan, Iraq 
and Somalia, or where it was about to fail such as Mozambique, Indonesia and Uganda, 
decentralisation and the reconstruction of local government constituted part of the state-
building effort.60 In this way, decentralisation was aimed at restoring peace within these 
countries. Ojendal and Dellnas, however, warn that decentralisation reforms, although in 
principle inclusive, if designed poorly can systematically exclude certain groups such as ethnic 
minorities or the poor; or result in the exclusion of territorial lines.61 Such cases of exclusion 
are naturally a driver of conflict and may thus hamper peace-building (as was the case in 
Yugoslavia).62 It can be concluded that in order for decentralisation to have the effect of 
promoting and sustaining peace, its processes and local government must be such as to promote 
inclusive representation of all groups.63 Therefore, where decentralisation reforms are properly 
designed it may work to consolidate and stabilise states. 
 
3 THE IMPORTANCE OF ACCOUNTABILITY IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
The previous section established that decentralisation has potential on many fronts. 
International literature, however, cautions that it is not any decentralisation programme that is 
likely to reap benefits usually associated with decentralisation. Manor, for instance, identifies 
three essential ingredients that must be present for decentralisation to be successful. These are 
(a) substantial powers must be devolved to elected bodies at lower levels; (b) substantial 
resources must be devolved to lower levels and; and (c) accountability mechanisms must be 
developed to ensure that local government is accountable.64 Substantial powers must be 
devolved to elected bodies at lower levels so that local officials are able to make essential 
decisions on issues that affects the lives of people at the local level.65 Substantial resources are 
necessary given that what local government can achieve partially depends on the resources they 
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have available.66 The last condition, an accountable local government, is the most important 
ingredient for the purpose of this study. This chapter will, therefore, be limited to a discussion 
of the accountability ingredient.  
 
According to the World Bank, accountability is one of the cornerstones of good governance.67 
Accountability entails the development of objective standards that are utilised to evaluate the 
ongoing effectiveness of public bodies and public officials.68 These objective standards thus 
serve as a means by which municipalities and its leadership can be held responsible for their 
action (or inaction) when utilising public resources and authority.69 Cronje and Smit provide 
that accountability means that the responsible public servants will be expected to account for 
outcomes, positive or negative, for that portion of the work directly under their control.70 Parker 
and Gould further provide that accountability is also associated with the concept of honesty 
and ethics.71 Furthermore, Koppell provides that accountability has five different dimensions 
namely, transparency, liability, controllability, responsibility, and responsiveness.72 
Accountability mechanisms that are developed should, therefore, be aimed at ensuring that 
these elements are given effect to. 
 
The need for accountability mechanisms can be best described through Bentham’s principle: 
‘the more strictly we are watched, the better we behave’.73 With regard to accountability in 
local government, Ribot and Agrawal argue that if powers are decentralised to actors who are 
not accountable to their constituents or who are accountable only to themselves, then 
decentralisation is not likely to accomplish its stated aims.74 Their argument is supported by 
Crawford who conducted a study to determine the extent to which decentralisation has 
                                                          
66 Manor (2013) 32. 
67 World Bank ‘Accountability in governance’ available at 
https://siteresources.worldbank.org/PUBLICSECTORANDGOVERNANCE/Resources/AccountabilityGovernan
ce.pdf (accessed 5 February 2019). 
68 Kathyola J & Oluwatoyin J Decentralisation in Commonwealth Africa: Experiences from Botswana, Cameroon, 
Ghana, Mozambique and Tanzania (2011) 9. 
69 Kathyola & Oluwatoyin (2011) 9. 
70 Cronje G & Smit P Management Principles: A Contemporary Edition for Africa 3 ed (2002) 192.  
71 Parker & Gould (2000) in Randa F & Tangke P (eds) ‘Developing Accountability Model of Local Government 
Organization: From Managerial Accountability to Public Accountability (Naturalistic Study on Local Government 
Tana Toraja) 211 (2015) Social and Behavioural Science 666.  
72 Koppell J ‘Pathologies of Accountability: ICANN and the Challenge of Multiple Accountabilities Disorder’ 
(2005) 65(1) Public Administration Review 95.  
73 Lindberg S ‘What Accountability Pressures Do MPs in Africa Face and How Do They Respond? Evidence from 
Ghana’ (2010) 48(1) Journal of Modern African Studies 117.  
74 Ribot J & Agrawal A ‘Accountability in Decentralization: A Framework with South Asia and West Africa’ 
(1999) 33 Journal of Developing Areas 478.  
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/ 
 14 
 
contributed to democratic deepening in Ghana. He established that decentralisation did not live 
up to its potential.75 This was due to various shortcomings identified at a local level which 
undermined and weakened both the accountability of elected representatives to the public and 
the local administrative officials to elected representatives.76  
 
When local government is not accountable, several ills can threaten the realisation of the 
benefits associated with decentralisation. These include corruption, fruitless and wasteful 
expenditure, and maladministration. Accountability, among other key ingredients, is, therefore, 
a sine qua non for local government to be effective in any country. There are two main types 
of accountability: horizontal or vertical.  
 
Horizontal accountability refers to the restraint of state institutions by other state institutions 
which might, therefore, include executive, legislative and judicial oversight of agencies.77  
Ferguson defines horizontal accountability as an umbrella-like approach to policy the 
government’s obligations such as development, policy development, and general public 
management practices.78 He further provides that horizontal accountability can be experienced 
across all levels of government (across boundaries between units of a single department or 
agency or among multiple departments or agencies).79 Oduor states that horizontal 
accountability includes activities such as an in-depth scrutiny by government institutions on 
misuse of public resources by other public agencies and branches of government.80 On a local 
level, horizontal accountability is embodied in the checks and balances internal to local 
government. Horizontal accountability can be promoted through various ways including, 
internal controls, oversight committees, performance agreements, codes of conduct and 
complaint and response mechanisms.  
 
Vertical accountability reflects the hierachial relationships and levels of access and control and 
includes non-state actors and the public.81 Vertical accountability involves mechanisms 
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through which citizens, mass media, and civil society seek to enforce standards of good 
performance on local officials.82 Relly views vertical accountability as the non-state 
approach.83 At a local level, vertical accountability, therefore, deals with external sources or 
actors that hold local officials accountable from outside the institution of local government.84 
Diamond and Morlino provides that this form of accountability is identified as ‘vertical’ 
because it runs upward from citizens to leaders.85 Vertical accountability is promoted through 
various mechanisms such as reporting, auditing, democratic elections, intergovernmental 
supervision, mass media, and civil society. The chapter will discuss selected mechanisms of 
fostering accountability at both horizontal and vertical level. 
 
3.1 Reporting and auditing 
Reporting is essential to ensure that local government accounts for how it spends public funds, 
how it performs its functions to give effect to its objectives and, to determine whether good 
governance practices are upheld in municipalities. According to Nickson, in most countries, 
the duty to report on local government performance and to audit municipalities is entrusted to 
an independent body.86 In other smaller countries, the Ministry of the Interior or the Ministry 
of Finance exercise this function.87 Municipalities must report to the relevant institution either 
quarterly or annually. From these reports, these institutions conduct an audit to accurately 
reflect the municipality’s status and to provide interested stakeholders with reliable information 
as to enable them to scrutinise the conduct of the municipality’s affairs and to exercise their 
collective powers to reward, control or remove those to whom that conduct has been confided.88 
In this way, the audit reports serve as a mechanism to enforce accountability as it seeks to 
evaluate municipal performance against the municipal budget.89  
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In terms of auditing, the role of an independent auditing body is particularly attractive as it is 
better positioned to give a transparent, honest, and accurate opinion of the state of local 
government. Auditing is an essential component for accountability as it provides an 
independent view of the extent to which local government officials are faithfully, efficiently 
and effectively executing their functions.90 Therefore, from these audit opinions or reports, 
interested stakeholders such as higher tiers of government, civic organisations and ordinary 
people can hold local officials accountable. Audit reports further equip higher tiers of 
government to determine the kind of intervention mechanisms required to rectify problems. 
Audit reports can also provide ordinary people and civil society with proof to analyse whether 
local government has been performing adequately. In doing so, independent auditing bodies 
perform an important function as it provides certainty and paints a clear picture of how 
municipalities are performing against the legislation and policy targets. The effectiveness of 
such independent bodies in strengthening accountability may be diluted where the institution 
is not independent or adequately resourced. It is, therefore, important that they remain free 
from any personal or external impairments in order to maintain an independent attitude and 
appearance.91 The impact of an independent auditor on accountability is also dependent on the 
cooperation of the municipalities itself. An independent auditing body’s impact on 
accountability is thus also likely to be minimal where municipalities do not comply with their 
duty to submit financial reports timeously or if they submit poor financial statements.  
 
3.2 Intergovernmental supervision 
In most countries with decentralised systems of government, higher levels of government are 
often tasked with supervising the affairs of local government.92 Supervision refers to higher 
spheres of government that provide regulatory frameworks within which local authorities are 
to exercise their powers and perform their functions. Supervision of local government activities 
is essential to ensure that local government operates efficiently and effectively. Supervision by 
higher spheres of government over local government is carried out in several ways, including 
regulation, monitoring and intervention.93 Litvack et al provide that without central monitoring, 
there can be no assurance that functions of national importance are performed adequately once 
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they have been decentralised. Monitoring refers to the establishment of mechanisms aimed at 
continuously evaluating the general performance of local government.94 It is undertaken to 
determine whether there is compliance with the relevant legislation and policies that apply to 
local government by evaluating municipal practices, its internal controls and by investigating 
allegations of mismanagement.95 Machingauta argues that the power to monitor the 
performance and compliance of local government must be coupled with the power to cause an 
investigation into suspected acts of misconduct and non-compliance.96 Manor states that when 
elected bodies at local level do not perform as required, other tiers of government should be 
empowered to intervene in the local affairs of a municipality.97 The act of intervention means 
to involve oneself in a situation, especially for the purpose of influencing or altering a 
situation.98 In this context, it refers to the instance where higher tiers of government involve 
itself in the affairs of local government in order to correct identified shortcomings.99 
Intervention can be effective in ensuring that those responsible for creating problems in local 
government are held accountable. The nature and scope of intervention powers, however, vary 
from country to country. It is however important that the necessary procedural requirements 
and oversight mechanisms complement such intervention powers to prevent the abuse of such 
powers. 
 
3.3 Codes of conduct 
Codes of conduct are an important mechanism of not only promoting horizontal accountability 
but also for vertical accountability. Codes of conduct contain both open guidelines about 
desirable behaviour and closed guidelines pointing at prohibited behaviour.100 In a 
municipality, the codes of conduct can be used to hold elected officials and staff to account by 
measuring their conduct against these provisions and enforcing sanctions where necessary. 
Embedding a code of conduct can contribute to the emergence of ethical leaders and staff and 
thus responsible corporate citizens. This is supported by a study conducted by Somers who 
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found that there is a greater sense of ethics and integrity in organisations which had a code of 
conduct.101 The effectiveness of the code of conduct is however dependent on its continuous 
implementation. Ayee points out that codes of conduct are not effective on their own as those 
who follow them are not the corrupt ones.102 Instead what is required is for the code of conduct 
to be enforced against those who are in breach of such code. This requires positive action by 
other officials who are mandated with the function to ensure that there is compliance with the 
code of conduct. The codes of conduct should also be publicised to make it easier for the public, 
media, and civil society to play their watchdog function. The role of the relevant body in 
ensuring that the codes are enforced is important because where codes of conduct are not 
effectively and constantly implemented against wrongdoers in local government, 
accountability is weakened and unlawful and unethical conduct is instead tolerated and allowed 
to go unchecked. This often results in the deepening of problems usually associated with 
decentralisation. 
 
3.4 Internal oversight structures  
Municipal oversight is of critical importance in order to ensure that public funds are allocated 
effectively.103 Internal oversight structures refer to those structures within a municipality that 
are required to carry out, inter alia, internal audit, evaluative and investigative functions. In 
addition to this, these structures also provide support to the council in order to improve the 
governance of a municipality. In most countries, there is often a requirement for each council 
to establish some structures, known as committees, which are responsible for carrying out 
delegated functions such as exercising oversight on behalf of the council.104 Chen and Wu posit 
that committees offer three main benefits: knowledge specialisation, task division efficiency 
and accountability.105 Such Committees can promote accountability in municipalities by 
ensuring that the executive and the administration account for how they exercise powers and 
functions. This is achieved by increasing supervision over them using committee structures.106 
The nature of committees established by the council, however, varies from country to country. 
                                                          
101 Somers M ‘Ethical Codes and Organizational Context: A Study of the Relationship Between Codes of Conduct, 
Employee Behaviour and Organizational Values’ (2001) 30(2) Journal of Business Ethics 185–195. 
102 Ayee J ‘Corruption and the Future of the Public Service in Africa’ (2002) 35 Law and Politics in Africa 21.  
103 Honadle B, Costa J & Cigler B Fiscal Health for Local Government: An Introduction to Concepts, Practical 
Analysis and Strategies (2003) 134. 
104 Humes S The Structure of Local Governments Throughout the World: A Comparative Introduction (1959) 
95. 
105 Chen K & Wu A ‘The Structure of Board Committees’ (2016) Working Paper 17-032 at 7. 
106 Matkin (2010) 29.  
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/ 
 19 
 
For example, committees can vary in size, status and power.107 Humes distinguishes between 
ad hoc committees and standing committees. The former refers to committees that are 
established to perform a specific function and their existence terminates upon the completion 
of that task. The latter, on the other hand, is a continuing body although its membership might 
change.108 The most common committees are oversight committees (portfolio or otherwise) 
municipal public account committees, and internal audit committees. In fact, survey research 
demonstrates that nearly half of all local governments have oversight committees such as an 
audit committee.109 In most cases, these committees report directly to the council. Committees 
are an important accountability mechanism as they aid the municipal council to exercise its 
oversight function. A robust debate between the council and administration is essential to hold 
the executive and administration accountable. However, to do so council requires information. 
Committees may be viewed as the eyes and ears of a council, equipped with the skills and 
expertise to detect any questionable activities in the execution of a municipality’s function. 
Therefore, through these committees, the council is furnished with information that empowers 
it to engage in meaningful interactions with the executive and senior management. Given the 
important role they play, it is important that these committees are equipped with the necessary 
resources to enable them to perform their functions effectively. Matkin further provides that 
the effectiveness of a committee itself is likely to depend on the independence of their 
membership, the expertise of their membership and the functions that they will perform.110  
 
3.5 Democratic elections 
Representative democracy means that citizens are sovereigns that delegate their functions to 
the agents, that is the politicians.111 Therefore, the key to making modern representative 
democracies work is through delegation. The citizens delegate the authority to make important 
political decisions to a large and differentiated class of politicians who then act in their name 
and place.112 This is in line with the general argument that ‘in a democracy, the question of 
government ought to be decided by the governed’ because the authority to exercise political 
                                                          
107 Humes (1959) 96. 
108 Humes (1959) 94–95. 
109 See West J & Berman E ‘Increasing Urban Government Financial Accountability: The Role of Multiple 
Stakeholders’ (2002) 14(4) Journal of Public Budgeting, Accounting and Financial Management 497–534.  
110 Matkin (2010) 31. 
111 Giannetti D & Benoit K Intra-Party Politics and Coalition Governments (2009) 25. 
112 Giannetti & Benoit (2009) 26. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/ 
 20 
 
power resides ultimately in the people.113 One way of exercising this decision is through 
democratic elections.  
In most countries, democratic elections are the main vertical accountability tool available to 
citizens to  hold local representatives accountable for their performance. Grant provides that 
electoral choice is a key mechanism of accountability such that public office may be forfeited 
if citizens trust and support in a particular political party is lost.114 It should, however, be noted 
that in order for elections to be deemed as an effective accountability mechanism, they must 
be regular, free and fair. It is only when elections are regular, free and fair that the true election 
choice of the local community is likely to be reflected.115  
Moreover, elections are a crucial mechanism which enables citizens and other political parties 
to work together to establish accountability. According to Strøm and Müller, competitive 
political parties are without a doubt one of the most important organisations on which 
democratic accountability rests.116 This is because it is the political parties that must ensure 
accountability in all stages of delegation (from voters to their elected representatives (the 
legislators), from the legislators to the head of the executive branch, from the head of the 
executive branch to the heads of different executive departments and from the heads of 
different executive departments to their respective civil servants).117 
However, accountability may be weakened and citizens, in turn, may be poorly served by 
politicians when political parties fail to achieve what they were voted into office for. For 
example, citizens may not be able to keep their agents honest and diligent once they have 
assumed office and instead those politicians may engage in unethical activities. However, in 
democracies such as South Africa there are other accountability mechanisms that serve as 
checks on political parties behaviour such as the courts and the media to mention a few.118  
 
 
3.6 Reporting back mechanisms 
Reporting back mechanisms can also be effective in promoting accountability at a local level. 
These are mechanisms that are aimed at establishing lines of communication between 
                                                          
113 O’Flynn I Deliberative Democracy and Divided Societies (2006) 34. 
114 Grant U Local Government Decision-Making: Citizen Participation and Local Government Accountability 
(2002) 15. 
115 Grant (2002) 15. 
116 Strøm K & Müller W ‘Parliamentary democracy, agency problems and party politics’ in Gianetti D & Benoit 
K (2006) 25. 
117 Strøm & Müller (2006) 26. 
118 Strøm & Müller (2006) 27. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/ 
 21 
 
interested stakeholders and local authorities. Reporting back mechanisms include for example 
mass meetings or the publishing of information in newspapers and on the internet, among other 
platforms. According to Manor, many countries have included in systems of decentralisation a 
requirement that councillors have regular mass meetings with the local community.119 In 
certain countries, these meetings allow for decisions to be taken. However, in other countries, 
participants are merely permitted to discuss local issues, question councillors, and select 
beneficiaries of government programmes.120 During such meetings, local citizens can be 
informed of how the municipality is addressing their concerns and ways in which the 
implementation of local programmes can be improved. The information provided to citizens 
during these meetings is critical as it enables members of the community to hold councillors 
accountable when these decisions are not implemented. While mass meetings may have the 
potential to strengthen downward accountability, Manor states that this mechanism often does 
not do much to ensure downward accountability.121 Mohan and Stokke support this contention 
and state that in many countries, development organisations and governments are finding that 
participation programmes do not result in sustainable, influential forms of voice expressions 
that impact on the incentives facing public officials and thus the outcomes of the governance 
process.122 In such instances, accountability is weakened. Thus, it is important to ensure that 
where such report back mechanisms are used, that they are meaningful. 
 
3.7 The role of civil society and media 
Civil society can play a fundamental role in holding local government accountable. Shoki 
defines civil society as ‘a range of organised groupings that occupy the public space between 
the state and individual citizens’.123 While civil society organisations are regulated, they are 
neither formed, nor controlled by the state or the private sector.124 In this way, civil society 
organisations maintain operational independence.125 Civil society organisations can question 
issues such as poor service delivery, corruption, compliance with legislation and ethical 
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standards.126 Further, civil society organisations can uncover potential abuses or misuse of 
public funds, thus, providing an independent mechanism of holding municipalities 
accountable. Civil society organisations can produce valuable information and mobilise the 
local community to apply pressure and call on local officials to account for their actions or non-
action. Similarly, the media performs a similar function in society. The media’s core function 
is to disseminate accurate, unbiased and reliable information pertaining to the affairs of a 
municipality, whether good or bad; to enable stakeholders to formulate their own opinions and 
to hold a municipality accountable on this basis.127 The media is thus a mechanism that gives 
a voice to different segments of society. At the same time, the media acts not only as a watchdog 
by observing political processes at a local level and then reporting thereon, but it is also a means 
through which local representatives can communicate and interact with interested 
stakeholders.128 Grant and Devas state that local media is an important mechanism for 
spreading political news and public information but they often do not have the required 
resources to undertake investigative journalism,129 thus making them less effective to ensure 
accountability. It should further be noted that while civil society organisations and the media 
have the potential to strengthen vertical accountability in local government, they may not live 
up to their potential if they are not independent or captured by elites. Moreover, they require a 
conducive operating environment and adequate resources which tend to be absent in most 
African countries. 
 
4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has demonstrated that, if local government is to be effective, it is critical that 
mechanisms are developed to ensure both horizontal and vertical accountability. Where these 
mechanisms are effective, along with the other essential conditions mentioned above, local 
government has the potential to live up to its promises. However, as Manor suggests, where 
any of these conditions are absent, local government (and therefore decentralisation) will fail. 
In addition, where any of these conditions are present but weak, local government will function 
less than well.130 Hence it is important for these accountability mechanisms to not only be 
present in municipalities but also function effectively in municipalities. This further 
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demonstrates that there is a nexus between the potential of local government and accountability 
mechanisms in local government. The more effective these accountability mechanisms are, the 
more likely it is that local government will live up to its promises. However, the less effective 
these accountability mechanisms are, the more likely it is that local government will fail to 
fulfil its objectives. Effective accountability mechanisms are therefore an absolute requirement 
to hold local government accountable in practice. The next chapter seeks to establish if the 
South African local government system entrenches mechanisms of promoting accountability. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/ 
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CHAPTER 3: THE STATE OF ACCOUNTABILITY IN SOUTH AFRICAN LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The discussion in the previous chapter demonstrated that accountability is an absolute 
requirement for local government to live up to its potential. The purpose of this chapter is to 
establish whether the South African system of local government has necessary mechanisms of 
promoting and sustaining accountability in municipalities. If these mechanisms are in place, 
the question is whether they are effective in practice. It is argued that while South Africa has a 
variety of mechanisms designed to promote accountable local government, most of them have 
thus far failed to bring the desired result. The chapter briefly discusses the place and role of 
local government in South Africa to contextualise the study. It then examines the mechanisms 
that are available to promote accountable local government. Conclusive remarks are provided 
last.  
 
2 THE PLACE AND ROLE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT  
Section 40(1) of the Constitution provides that in the Republic, government is constituted as 
national, provincial and local spheres of government which are distinctive, interdependent and 
interrelated.131 The word ‘distinctive’ confirms local government’s autonomy as a sphere of 
government and it determines the manner in which local government should perform its 
functions.132 The words ‘interdependent’ and ‘interrelated’ in turn refer to the constitutional 
commitment to an overall system of cooperative government in South Africa.133 The autonomy 
of local government is further confirmed in section 151(3) of the Constitution which provides 
that ‘a municipality has the right to govern, on its own initiative, the local government affairs 
of its community, subject to national and provincial legislation, as provided for in the 
Constitution’.134 Therefore, from these provisions, it can be established that the place of local 
government is entrenched in the Constitution as a distinctive, interrelated and interdependent 
sphere of government. Local government, as the sphere of government that is physically closest 
to the people, has been constitutionally assigned broader developmental duties and specific 
service delivery mandate, as stated in paragraph 1 of Chapter 1.  
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Municipalities are required to structure and manage their administrations, budgeting and 
planning processes in order to give priority to the basic needs of their respective communities 
and to promote the social and economic development of these communities.135 The 
Constitution provides that the executive and legislative authority of a municipality is vested in 
its municipal council (council).136 This makes local government a hybrid system of 
government.137 Section 156 of the Constitution provides that a municipality has executive and 
legislative authority in respect of, and the right to administer, the local government matters 
listed in Part B of Schedule 4 and Part B of Schedule 5 of the Constitution and any other matters 
assigned to it by national and provincial legislation.138 Part B of Schedules 4 and 5 lists a variety 
of important matters such as electricity and gas regulation, water and sanitation services, land-
use planning, municipal health, municipal roads traffic and parking, and refuse removal.139 
Thus, municipalities have a variety of powers and functions needed in achieving their 
objectives and fulfilling their developmental mandate.140  
 
As observed in the previous chapter, the fulfilment of local government’s service delivery and 
developmental mandate does not only require that local government has significant relevant 
powers but also sufficient resources to fund the delivery of public services. The Constitution 
recognises that municipalities require sufficient resources by granting them a variety of 
resource-raising measures.141 Section 229(1)(a) to (b) provides that subject to the Constitution, 
a municipality may impose rates on property and surcharges on fees for services provided by 
or on behalf of the municipality and if authorised by national legislation, other taxes appropriate 
to local government.142 In addition to this, local government is entitled to an equitable share of 
revenue raised nationally to complement local revenue-raising effort.143 Local government may 
also receive other allocations from national government revenue that can either be provided on 
a conditional or unconditional basis.144 De Visser and Steytler argue that as a result of local 
government’s constitutional revenue-raising powers, local government is largely self-sufficient 
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and has thus developed a more autonomous status.145 As a consequence, local government, 
especially most urban municipalities, is less reliant on transfers from national government.146 
In fact, transfers make up only 26 per cent of municipal budgets whereas, on provincial level, 
such transfers constitute 97 per cent of provincial budgets.147 Hence, most municipalities have 
a sound financial base. 
 
It can be observed from the above discussion that local government in South Africa does indeed 
have substantial relevant powers and functions. These are complemented by a variety of 
revenue streams to fund the delivery of public services. Thus, it can be concluded that, in a 
significant number of municipalities, the failure of service delivery cannot be directly attributed 
to the absence of sufficient powers, functions and resources. As observed in paragraph 3 of 
Chapter 2, sufficient powers, functions and resources are necessary but are not the only 
ingredients for an effective system of local government. Local government must also be 
accountable. The key question, therefore, is whether provision is made in local government 
law for municipalities to be accountable. This question is the focus of the following section. 
 
3 ACCOUNTABILITY IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT  
The South African local government system is regarded by many as highly developed 
particularly concerning its institutions and legislation. The system enshrines a variety of 
mechanisms designed to foster and sustain accountability in municipalities. Channels for 
accountability are multiple and take many forms. There are internal mechanisms of fostering 
accountability such as democratic elections, codes of conduct, performance agreements, 
internal controls and oversight committees. There are also external mechanisms, which mainly 
involve the role of external actors such as the national and provincial governments, independent 
institutions, civil society, and the media. This section discusses some of the key mechanisms 
provided in local government legislation of promoting and sustaining accountability at local 
government level.  
 
3.1 Codes of conduct 
The Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 (MSA) provides for codes of 
conduct that both local political and administrative officials should adhere to when carrying 
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out their respective duties.148 The codes of conduct require, inter alia, that councillors and 
municipal staff perform the functions of office in good faith, honestly and in a transparent 
manner.149 They are also required to act in the best interest of the municipality and in such a 
way that the credibility and integrity of the municipality is not compromised.150 Councillors 
and administrative officials are prohibited from using their respective positions, privileges or 
confidential information for private gain or to improperly benefit other people.151 They should 
at all times disclose any direct or indirect interests in a matter before council.152 It is noteworthy 
that the codes of conduct prescribe the expected conduct of councillors and staff while  at the 
same time limiting how and for what purposes decisions are to be made. In this way, the codes 
of conduct are important accountability mechanisms for ensuring that decisions are taken for a 
legitimate governmental purpose. Section 37(e) of the Municipal Structures Act requires the 
Speaker of the council to ensure that councillors comply with the Code of Conduct for 
Councillors.153 Breaches of the Code of Conduct for municipal staff members are dealt with in 
terms of the disciplinary procedures of the municipality.154 Item 14 of Schedule 1 and Item 
14A of Schedule 2 of the Municipal Structures Act provides for the disciplining of officials 
that contravene the codes of conduct.155 
Even the public has a role to play in reporting any unethical conduct from municipal officials. 
While the Code of Conduct is silent on this, it is argued that this role arises from the fact that 
the community comprises one of the essential structures that make up a municipality as 
envisaged in section 2 of the MSA. Therefore, by reporting incidents of alleged unethical 
conduct from municipal officials, it should be viewed as forming part of the community’s 
obligations to contribute to democratic and accountable local government. This approach has 
already been adopted by the City of Cape Town. In terms of the City’s Ethics Code, members 
of the public are encouraged to raise concerns about the activities of its officials, through their 
Fraud Hotline, so that they can be investigated and acted upon.156  
 
In practice, however, a significant number of councillors and officials do not always exhibit 
the required conduct when carrying their roles. The perceived, alleged, and proven cases of 
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corruption and maladministration that involve municipal officials all contribute to the 
perception that codes of conduct are either not implemented or simply not taken seriously.157 
The only way to check corruption is to hold others accountable for corrupt activities. However, 
the AGSA established that this is not the case as action is not always taken against wrongdoers. 
The leadership’s inaction (including both the head of administration and the council) has 
created a culture of no consequence management in municipalities.158 The report also 
confirmed that, although prohibited by legislation, contracts to the value of R15 million were 
awarded to suppliers in which councillors themselves had an interest.159 The Act Report 2018, 
Corruption Watch also reported that corruption in municipalities increased from 6,4 per cent 
in 2017 to 9,2 per cent in 2018.160 This evidence suggests that the codes of conducts of 
councillors and municipal staff are not being enforced sufficiently, in the process undermining 
accountable local government.  
 
3.2 Performance agreement 
Section 57 of the MSA provides that a municipal manager of a municipality and managers who 
are directly accountable to the municipal manager are required to have in place a performance 
agreement that must be concluded on an annual basis between themselves and the municipal 
council.161 The performance agreement must further include the following: performance 
objectives and targets that must be met, and the timeframes within which these must be 
achieved; standards and procedures for evaluating performance and intervals for evaluation 
and; the consequences of substandard performance.162 Performance agreements make it clear 
that senior municipal management must answer for the delivery or non-delivery of certain 
services and the achievement of particular objectives. As such performance agreements can be 
a useful mechanism of ensuring accountability of municipal officials to the council. They 
enable a council to monitor and review the performance of the administration and to hold them 
accountable for any under-performance by enforcing sanctions for substandard performance.  
 
In practice, as in the case with codes of conduct, performance agreements are not effective in 
ensuring accountability in municipalities due to many reasons. This is partially because 
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performance agreements are not always deemed as important for governance in municipalities. 
In the 2011/2012 financial year, the AGSA established that 36 of the municipal managers 
appointed in the same financial year, did not have signed performance agreements.163 The 
AGSA further established that mayors had not signed the performance agreements of 36 
municipal managers while the performance agreements of 37 municipal managers did not 
comply with the provisions of the MSA.164 The AGSA also found that in 33 municipalities, 20 
per cent of senior managers did not have signed performance agreements whereas, in 85 
municipalities, performance evaluation for municipal managers were not conducted.165  Not 
having signed performance agreements can have important ramifications for a municipality. 
This is because the signature proves that the municipal official has applied his or her mind to 
be bound by the terms set out in the performance agreement. Otherwise, it would be difficult 
to argue that a contract was concluded on the basis of the principles of offer and acceptance. In 
Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development v C J C Myburgh and Others,166 the court 
confirmed that ‘a contract comes into existence when, and only when, the written document… 
has been signed by both parties’.167 This rule derives from the common law of contract 
applicable to contracts. Therefore, in such instances where the performance agreements are not 
signed, it may become increasingly difficult to hold municipal officials accountable in that, 
theoretically speaking, they are not bound to render performances in accordance with the 
standards provided for in the performance agreements. Courts have, however, held otherwise 
in practice. In Strickett v Mathabeng Local Municipality,168 the court made it clear that section 
57(1) of the MSA merely requires that an agreement in writing is adopted and acted upon and 
that a signature is not required.169 It is not clear why the court made this ruling in respect of 
performance agreement which, by its very nature, is a normal contract whereas it has held 
otherwise in respect of other employment contracts as mentioned above. It is argued that this 
ruling may be incorrect. All contracts, such as performance agreements, are also subject to the 
laws which arise by operation of law such as the laws that derives from the common law of 
contract as mentioned above. Further, it is clear as evidenced by the AGSA that the failure to 
sign performance agreements in municipalities is problematic, hence the AGSA has reported 
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thereon for a number of years. To avoid future disputes regarding the enforceability of the 
performance agreements against an under-performing municipal official, and to ensure 
compliance with the common law of contract, it is thus submitted that that all performance 
agreements should be signed.  
 
Five years later, during the 2016/17 financial year, the AGSA reported that, while performance 
management has improved over the years, accountability continues to fail in municipalities due 
to, inter alia, not implementing consequences for poor performance.170 A study conducted by 
Myataza in selected municipalities in the Eastern Cape Province also found that performance 
management is overall weak in municipalities. The findings of the study suggest that poor 
performance management was due to non-submission of performance reports for audit 
purposes.171 Thus, while performance agreements have the potential to engender 
accountability, they are yet to live to their potential as officials are largely not held accountable 
for under-performance. 
 
3.3 Internal oversight structures  
Legislation makes provision for the establishment of structures, in the form of committees and 
units, to undertake the oversight function. Every municipal council is required to establish an 
audit committee, which is an independent advisory body mandated to advise the council, 
political office-bearers, the accounting officer and the management staff of a municipality or 
the board of directors.172 The committee advises on matters relating to, inter alia: risk 
management; the adequacy, reliability, and accuracy in financial reporting and information; 
effective governance and; performance management.173 The committee can be an important 
tool of fostering financial accountability by providing the council with credible findings, based 
on its analysis of the information received from the administration, which the council can use 
to hold its executive or administration to account. 174 Municipal councils are also allowed175  to 
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establish other oversight committees, such as the municipal public accounts committees 
(MPACs), to exercise oversight. MPACs, for instance, perform various functions including the 
assessment of the contents of the annual report, making recommendations to the council when 
it adopts the oversight report and annual report, examination of financial statements and audit 
reports, the consideration of improvements from the previous financial statements and audit 
reports and to advise council thereon.176 They also ensure that the recommendations of the 
AGSA and the audit committee are implemented.177 Thus, the MPACs can perform valuable 
functions in ensuring accountability in local government. 
 
In practice, several factors bring into question, the effectiveness of internal oversight structures, 
such as committees, in fostering accountability. Myataza established that internal oversight 
structures are often not adequately supported by heads of departments of municipalities and 
the findings made by structures such as internal audit units, are often unfairly challenged and, 
in some instances, rejected by managers.178 This seriously undermines the effectiveness of 
these oversight structures and as such, weakens accountability in municipalities. In the 
Mpumalanga province, the AGSA established that accountability continues to fail because, 
among other reasons, of the municipal management’s failure to implement the 
recommendations of MPACs and audit committees.179 In other cases, the committees are 
ineffective as they lack the expertise to perform their functions effectively. For example in the 
Limpopo province, the AGSA noted that regressions were reported as a result of, inter alia, 
audit committees and MPACs failure to rigorously review information submitted to them.180 
The AGSA also determined that most MPACs still do not have adequate capacity to fulfil their 
functions and municipal councils have been slow to address this matter.181 This lack of 
adequate capacity has had a negative impact on the effectiveness of the committees in assisting 
the council in ensuring accountability. Thus, despite their potential, internal oversight 
structures are yet to contribute meaningfully to accountable governance across all 
municipalities.  
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3.4 The role of national and provincial governments 
The responsibility to ensure that local government is accountable is also shared by the national 
and provincial governments. These spheres of government are empowered to supervise, by 
regulating, monitoring and supporting municipalities.182 If these supervisory mechanisms fail 
to bring about the desired result of ensuring that a municipality delivers on its executive 
obligation, the provincial government is empowered to intervene in local affairs in terms of 
section 139 of the Constitution.183 This accountability mechanism limits the autonomy of local 
government by enabling a provincial government to interfere with the autonomy of a 
municipality.184 Section 139(4) of the Constitution also allows the provincial executive to 
intervene when a municipality cannot or does not fulfil their obligation to approve a budget or 
any revenue-raising measures necessary to give effect to the budget.185 Further, section 139(5) 
of the Constitution requires a provincial executive to intervene if a municipality, as a result of 
that crisis, continues to be in breach of its mandate to provide basic services or to meet its 
financial commitments.186 The province must also intervene if a municipality admits that it is 
unable to meet its obligations or financial commitments. The national government is required 
to intervene where a provincial government is unable or unwilling to intervene to rectify the 
above mentioned financial crisis.187 An intervention may take the form of issuing a directive to 
the council, describing the extent of the failure to fulfil their obligations and stating the steps 
that must be taken to meet its obligations.188 It may take the form of assumption of the relevant 
responsibility within the particular municipality189 or dissolution of a council and appointment 
of an administrator, in its place until a new council has been elected.190 A temporary budget 
and a financial recovery plan can also be put in place. Thus, provincial and national 
governments have far-reaching supervisory powers to deal with problems at the local level and 
ensure that municipalities are accountable.191  
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In practice, supervisory powers are not effectively exercised when required. CoGTA noted that 
provincial and national government face key challenges to carry out their constitutional 
supervisory mandate over local government192, thus making them less effective. It further 
stated that the support and monitoring that is currently being provided to all municipalities 
require a higher level of co-ordination and customisation to the needs of individual 
municipalities.193 The Department established that there is a weak correlation between the 
number of municipalities that are financially distressed or underperforming and the number of 
section 139 interventions that have been made in this regard.194 As stated in paragraph 1 of 
Chapter 1, a 2018 study conducted by the Applied Constitutional Studies Laboratory found that 
municipal debt to ESKOM has reached R17 billion by December 2018, amounting to 20 per 
cent of Eskom’s total annual revenue.195 It established that 80 per cent of municipalities that 
are the worst defaulters for payment of bulk services to ESKOM have rather escaped provincial 
and national intervention.196 Thus, most provincial governments and the national government 
have failed to act in accordance with their respective constitutional obligation to intervene 
when it is required.197 Failure to intervene in such instances means that municipal officials 
responsible for any misdeeds are not called to account. The results are often that corruption, 
resource wastage, and maladministration in municipalities, among other ills, which erode trust 
in local government, go unchecked. 
 
3.5 The role of independent institutions 
The Constitution provides for the establishment of independent institutions aimed at 
strengthening accountability and democracy, in general. These include the Public Protector,198 
the South African Human Rights Commission,199 the Commission for the Promotion and 
Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities,200 the Commission 
for Gender Equality,201 and the AGSA.202 The AGSA has perhaps the most direct function in 
ensuring that local government is accountable. The AGSA is mandated, by the Constitution, to 
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audit and report on the accounts, financial statements and financial management of all 
municipalities.203 After auditing, the AGSA is required to submit its audit reports to any 
legislature with a direct interest in the audit report, and to any other authority as prescribed by 
national legislation.204 The Constitution requires all audit reports to be made publicly available 
to foster transparency.205 These reports often contain a number of recommendations for 
improving governance in municipalities. The AGSA provides accurate and reliable information 
about the true status of municipalities to all interested stakeholders. The audit reports provided 
by this supreme audit institution enable other stakeholders, such as the national and provincial 
governments and citizens, to hold local government accountable. In this way, the AGSA aids 
the role of these stakeholders in strengthening accountability in local government.  
 
The challenge associated with the AGSA’s role is that the AGSA’s recommendations are often 
not implemented in practice. This was noted by the AGSA in the 2016/2017 Audit report who 
stated that: 
 
‘The recommendations we made last year to improve audit outcomes and accountability, 
did not receive the necessary attention. This is evidenced by the findings from our audits 
that included attention not being paid to audit action plans, poor performance planning 
and budgeting (resulting in unauthorised expenditure of R12,6 billion) and regressions of 
varying degree in the status of internal control and the assurance provided by the different 
role players in local government’.206  
 
This challenge prompted, in 2018, an amendment of the Public Audit Act 25 of 2004 to 
empower the AGSA with more powers to enforce his or her recommendations.207 Another 
challenge that undermines the effectiveness of the AGSA as an accountability mechanism is 
the non-submission, late submission and submission of poor quality financial statements to the 
AGSA by municipalities. In terms of section 122(1)(a) MFMA: 
 
 ‘Every municipality or municipal entity is required to prepare, for each year, annual 
financial statements which fairly and accurately presents the state of affairs of that 
municipality or municipal entity, its performance against its budget, its management of 
revenue, expenditure, assets and liabilities, its business activities, its financial results and 
its financial position as at the end of the financial year’.208  
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However, financial statements often do not comply with these criteria and are thus not credible. 
Where financial statements are not credible, it becomes increasingly difficult to determine 
whether problems exist within the municipality. According to the AGSA, the failure to produce 
credible financial statements points to a lack of leadership and supervision as chief financial 
officers in municipalities do not review financial statements and the relevant supporting 
information before submitting them for audit purposes.209 It can be observed that while the 
AGSA has significant potential to promote accountability several challenges are constraining 
the AGSA’s role. Only time will tell if the increased powers of the AGSA will have a 
meaningful impact on accountability in municipalities. 
 
3.6  The role of the local community 
The local community also play a role in holding local government accountable in many ways. 
Elections are the main mechanism through which citizens and communities, at large, can hold 
its council and councillors accountable. Ideally, the threat of loss of office that comes with 
organising regular elections induces councils and councillors to become more responsive to the 
wishes and needs of the electorate.210 However, for local elections to serve as an effective 
accountability tool several conditions must be in place.  As argued in paragraph 3.4 of Chapter 
2, local elections are likely to act as an effective accountability mechanism when they are 
separated from national and provincial elections as is the case in South Africa where local 
elections are organised separately every five years.211 Further, voters must be willing to 
sanction their local representatives by looking at their past performance and by punishing poor 
governance by withdrawing their support.212 Steytler argues that ‘unless political choices are 
made on good government concerns and not on ethnic or other considerations, a political will 
opposed to corruption and maladministration is unlikely to bloom’.213 This indeed is a major 
problem that currently exist in local elections where voting is not often based on the 
performance of councillors and councils but on voters’ loyalty towards a certain party political 
party. In such cases, a directly accountability link between the voter and councillor is not 
achieved. Therefore, the effectiveness of local elections as an accountability tool in South 
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Africa will likely be achieved when citizens realise that they have a responsibility to exercise 
their right to vote responsibly. 
 
3.7  Role of civil society and the media 
In South Africa, civil society organisations play a two-dimensional role in local government. 
On one hand, they are often involved in the implementation of programmes funded by 
government.214 On the other hand, they form a countervailing force that is necessary for 
providing checks and balances to public sector agencies.215 Civil society organisations, 
therefore, play an integral role in ensuring that local government is accountable as it serves as 
a check on local government to prevent the abuse of powers and misuse of public funds. 
However, in practice, Kakumba provides that civil society organisations favour upward 
accountability as opposed to downward accountability to the citizens.216 While it may not be 
effective in ensuring downward accountability to citizens, civil society organisations 
nevertheless act to ensure that local government live up to its potential and achieve its 
objectives. However, several civic organisations that operate at the local level in South Africa 
have been effective in their watchdog role by, inter alia, mobilising communities and 
resourcing them to question decisions of municipalities. For example, in 2014 the City of Cape 
Town put an end to a contentious stand-off between itself and the public, which had dragged 
on for more than 15 years by announcing their plans to halt plans to sell part of Princess Vlei 
Mall to developers.217 This was made possible through the collective efforts of communities, 
environmentalists, academia and non-governmental organisations (NGOs).218 
 
The media also plays a crucial role in promoting accountability in local government. According 
to Norris, the media performs three key functions in ensuring that local government is 
accountable. First, the media is required to act as a watchdog over councillors and municipal 
officials and in this way promote accountability, transparency, and public scrutiny.219 This is 
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achieved through highlighting failures of local government, maladministration by local 
officials, and corruption at a local level. The media has brought several cases of corruption and 
resource wastage in local government into the public’s focus.220 Secondly, the media functions 
as a civic forum for political debate.221 This facilitates informed electoral choices and actions. 
Thirdly, the media functions as the agenda-setter for policy makers, strengthening government 
responsiveness.222 In South Africa, the media has often been accused of being bias, lacking 
credible reporting and of being captured by the elite.223 However, the media still plays an 
important role in promoting accountability at the local level.  
 
3.8  Service delivery protests 
The preceding sections discussed formal mechanisms of promoting accountability in 
municipalities. It should also be acknowledged that there are also informal mechanisms often 
used by the citizens such as service delivery protests. In South Africa, service delivery protests 
are a common feature of South Africa’s democracy that is often utilised by citizens to state 
their concerns and to hold local government accountable. Protests are usually carried out to 
emphasise a community’s dissatisfaction with the lack of service delivery, the quality of 
services rendered and the state of public representation at the grass-roots level.224 
 
In practice and as stated in paragraph 1 of Chapter 1, when members of the community become 
frustrated by a lack of responsiveness by municipalities, they often retaliate by taking their 
frustrations to the streets and engage in protest actions against the relevant municipality. The 
importance of protest action as a powerful advocacy tool utilised to hold government 
accountable has been recognised by the courts.225 In Mlungwana and Others v S and 
Another,226 the court held that section 12 of the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993,227 
which required that a convener of a gathering give notice of an assembly of more than 15 
people, limits the right to assemble peacefully and unarmed which is entrenched in section 17 
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of the Constitution.228 The court referred to the Garvas229 case which noted that protesting is a 
way of giving a voice to the voiceless. In this way, service delivery protests serve as a 
mechanism that enables citizens to speak up about matters such as corruption, 
maladministration, and resource wastage. According to Municipal IQ, service delivery protests 
at the end of September 2018 was at an all-time annual high with 198 protests compared to the 
previous record of 191 in 2014.230 This is an indication that citizens are becoming more and 
more aware of protest action as a means of voicing their concerns relative to other formal 
mechanisms of accountability. The increase also suggests that the state of service delivery by 
municipalities is not getting any better. 
 
 
4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter discussed the state of accountability in local government. It was established that 
while local government is constitutionally well positioned to deliver on its service delivery 
obligations and development mandate, by among other ways, being empowered with 
substantial powers and resources, it is failing to live up to its potential partially due to a lack of 
accountability. The chapter discussed some accountability mechanisms that have been 
established to ensure that local government is accountable. Evidence provided, however, 
indicates that these accountability mechanisms are not yet to be effective due to several reasons, 
including material non-compliance and non-implementation of the applicable legislation. 
Accountability in local government continues to fail because important role players such as 
provincial and national governments, municipal councils, committees, and local communities 
are not doing enough to ensure that this sphere that is closest to the people is accountable. The 
critical question, therefore, remains what can be done to improve the state of accountability in 
local government. Are King IV Principles useful in arresting this undesirable situation? This 
question will be interrogated in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE UTILITY OF KING IV PRINCIPLES IN ADDRESSING THE STATE 
OF ACCOUNTABILITY IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
1 INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter 2 it was established that accountability is one of the essential ingredients of an 
effective system of local government. Chapter 3 established that South Africa possess some of 
the key ingredients, including accountability mechanisms, needed for local government to live 
up to its potential. However, it was also demonstrated that while accountability mechanisms 
are in place, they are not effective in ensuring that local government is accountable. The lack 
of accountability in local government was identified in paragraph 1 of Chapter 1 as one of the 
main causes behind service delivery failures in South Africa. Against this background, it raises 
the question of how can accountability be enhanced at local government level? What can the 
public sector learn from the private sector regarding accountable governance? This Chapter 
explores whether, by utilising the corporate governance principles of King IV Report that are 
applicable to municipalities, accountability can be strengthened in local government. It 
interprets these principles and demonstrates how they can be applied in municipalities. This 
chapter provides, a brief background of the King Reports and related principles on corporate 
governance. It then discusses the application of selected King IV Principles in local 
government with an objective to establish how they can be incorporated in municipalities to 
address the accountability failures. 
 
2 A BRIEF BACKGROUND TO KING IV REPORT ON CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
In 1994, the King Report I on Corporate Governance was published by the King Committee, 
headed by former High Court Justice Mervin King S.C. King I incorporated a Code of 
Corporate Practices and Conduct that was the first of its kind in South Africa.231 The purpose 
of the King I Report was to promote the highest standards of corporate governance in South 
Africa particularly in the private sector. By doing so, King Report I established recommended 
standards of conduct for boards and directors of listed companies, banks and certain state-
owned enterprises.232 King Report II was released in 2002. It extended the list of institutions to 
which the King Report apply, including private entities and organs of state.233 The King Report 
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III succeeded King II in 2009234 and contained 75 principles for promoting good governance.235 
The King IV, which was published in 2016 and came into effect on 1 April 2017, is the latest 
report.236 
 
While all four King Reports are premised on ethical and effective leadership, King IV is 
different in that it was drafted to make its application to all organisations such as the private 
and public sector, large or small and for-profit and non-profit organisations, easier.237 King IV, 
unlike its predecessors, has moved away from the ‘apply or explain’ to ‘apply and explain’. 
There are seven concepts that form the building blocks of King IV namely: ethical leadership, 
the organisation in society, corporate citizenship, sustainable development, stakeholder 
inclusivity, integrated thinking and integrated reporting.238 King IV further highlights the 
desired governance outcomes that the principles are designed to achieve namely: ethical 
culture, good performance, effective control and legitimacy.239 Another innovation of King IV 
is the inclusion of sector supplements for municipalities and other sectors. The purpose of 
providing for sector supplements is to provide high-level guidance and direction on how the 
King IV Principles should be interpreted and applied in municipalities and other 
organisations.240 King IV thus makes it easier for these principles to be incorporated in 
municipalities to promote good governance. 
 
3 THE UTILITY OF KING IV 
The King IV Report has reduced the 75 principles in King III to 17 principles of which 16 of 
these principles apply to municipalities.241 The 16 principles are listed in table 1 below. 
 
Table 1: King IV Principles that are applicable to municipalities242 
‘Principle 1: The council should lead ethically and effectively. 
Principle 2: The council should govern the ethics of the municipality in a way that 
supports the establishment of an ethical culture. 
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Principle 3: The council should ensure that the municipality is and is seen to be a 
responsible corporate citizen. 
Principle 4: The council should appreciate that the municipality’s core purpose, its risks 
and opportunities, strategy, business model, performance and sustainable development 
are all inseparable elements of the value creation process. 
Principle 5: The council should ensure that reports issued by the municipality enable 
stakeholders to make informed assessments of the municipality’s performance and its 
short, medium and long-term prospects. 
Principle 6: The council should serve as the focal point and custodian of corporate 
governance in the municipality. 
Principle 7: The council should comprise the appropriate balance of knowledge, skills, 
experience, diversity and independence for it to discharge its governance role and 
responsibilities objectively and effectively. 
Principle 8: The council should ensure that its arrangements for delegation within its 
own structures promote independent judgment and assist with balance of power and the 
effective discharge of its duties. 
Principle 9: The council should ensure that the evaluation of its own performance and 
that of its committees, its speaker and its individual councillors, support continued 
improvement in its performance and effectiveness. 
Principle 10: The council should ensure that the appointment of, and delegation to, 
management contribute to role clarity and the effective exercise of authority and 
responsibilities. 
Principle 11: The council should govern risk in a way that supports the municipality in 
setting and achieving its strategic objectives. 
Principle 12: The council should govern technology and information in a way that 
supports the municipality setting and achieving its strategic objectives. 
Principle 13: The council should govern compliance with applicable laws and adopted, 
non-binding rules, codes and standards in a way that supports the municipality being 
ethical and a good corporate citizen. 
Principle 14: The council should ensure that the municipality remunerates fairly, 
responsibly and transparently so as to promote the achievement of strategic objectives 
and positive outcomes in the short, medium and long-term. 
Principle 15: The council should ensure that assurance services and functions enable 
an effective control environment, and that these support the integrity of information for 
internal decision-making and of the municipality’s external reports. 
Principle 16: In the execution of its governance role and responsibilities, the council 
should adopt a stakeholder-inclusive approach that balances the needs, interests and 
expectations of material stakeholders in the best interests of the municipality over time.’  
 
The question of how to incorporate these principles in municipalities is yet to be answered. It 
has been acknowledged that some of these principles may possibly conflict with existing local 
government legislation.243 In such a scenario the relevant piece of legislation should obviously 
prevail. However, where King IV demands a higher standard of governance than what is 
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provided in legislation, a municipality should aspire to achieve that higher standard in the 
interest of sound governance.244 Thus the fact that King IV advocates for a higher standard of 
governance  (as will become clear later in this Chapter) does not necessarily mean that this 
amounts to a conflict.245 A conflict would only arise when King IV and legislated provisions 
cannot be reconciled.246 Further, King IV makes it clear that the principles are applicable to 
category A, B and C municipalities as provided for in the MSA.247 It is noted that municipalities 
may vary in size, resources and extent and complexity of activities.248 King IV nonetheless 
provides that municipalities should still align with the principles and consider the practices of 
King IV.249 While all the 16 principles may have a direct or indirect positive effect in improving 
the state of local government, the chapter will only examine the eight principles whose 
incorporation in municipalities is likely to directly impact on accountability. The Constitution 
states that the legislative and executive authority of a municipality is vested in its municipal 
council.250 It further provides that a ‘[m]unicipal council makes decisions concerning the 
exercise of all the powers and the performance of all the functions of the municipality’.251 Thus, 
there is no doubt that the council is the highest governing body of a municipality vested with 
all decision-making authority. King IV Report recognises this constitutional reality by placing 
the municipal council at the centre of its interventions designed to improve municipal 
governance. It places the obligation to implement corporate governance principles squarely on 
the council and demand a certain level of conduct from its members. The Report recognises 
that the role of a council is demanding and thus, necessitates a diversity of skills in its 
membership. The paper will discuss these obligations, responsibilities, and expectations below. 
 
3.1 Ethical and effective leadership  
Rossouw notes that unlike its predecessors, King IV recognises that good governance does not 
start with principles, rules or procedures, but with the character of those tasked with upholding 
good governance.252 Pava and Krausz support this notion and state that companies with positive 
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ethical leadership experienced improved performance in their finances.253 Hildreth states that 
‘while people want results from [local] government, it takes money to make them happen’.254 
Therefore, the fiscal health of a municipality is important. Above all, it is an indication of a 
municipality’s ability to provide adequate, uninterrupted services to their constituents.255 
Therefore, from the findings made by Pava et al, it can be deduced that ethical leadership is of 
paramount importance to promote the financial health of a municipality and, thus, to enable it 
to provide quality essential services.  
 
Furthermore, in a study conducted by Agbim, it was found that there is a significant nexus 
between ethical leadership and corporate governance.256 King IV defines corporate governance 
as the exercise of ethical and effective leadership by the municipality towards the achievement 
of the following: an ethical culture, good performance, effective control, and legitimacy.257 
Therefore, ethical and effective leadership is essential to enable municipalities to achieve the 
stated themes of corporate governance. Even the courts have set the record straight on issues 
of ethical leadership. In the case of Mpofu v South African Broadcasting Corporation Ltd and 
Others (Mpofu case),258 the court confirmed that good governance is based on a clear code of 
ethical behaviour and personal integrity exercised by leadership.259 The court further 
emphasised that in dealing with the affairs of any organisation there must be ethical 
behaviour.260 King IV recognises the importance of ethical leadership to the effective 
performance of any organisation such as a municipality. Principle 1 of King IV requires the 
council to lead ethically and effectively.261 In fact, ethical leadership forms the foundation upon 
which all 16 principles applicable to municipalities are based on. What does ethical and 
effective leadership entail in a municipal context? 
 
                                                          
253 Pava M & Krausz J ‘The Association Between Corporate Social-Responsibility and Financial Performance: 
The Paradox of Social Cost’ (1996) 15(3) Journal of Business Ethics 322.  
254 Hildreth W ‘Financial management: The centrality of the fiscal in local government and politics’ in Gargan J 
(eds) Handbook of Local Government Administration (1997) 159. 
255 Honadle, Costa & Cigler (2003) 1. 
256 Agbim K ‘Effect of Ethical Leadership on Corporate Governance, Performance and Social Responsibility: A 
Study of Selected Deposit Money Banks in Beneu State, Nigeria’ (2018) 2 International Journal of Community 
Development & Management Studies 28.  
257 King IV (2016) 11. 
258 (GPHC) unreported case no 13815/2008 (19 May 2008). 
259 Mpofu v South African Broadcasting Corporation Ltd and Others (GPHC) unreported case no 13815/2008 (19 
May 2008) para 64. 
260 Mpofu v South African Broadcasting Corporation Ltd and Others para 64. 
261 King IV (2016) 40. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/ 
 44 
 
Ethical leadership is exemplified by integrity, competence, responsibility, accountability, 
fairness, and transparency.262 It involves the anticipation and prevention, or otherwise 
amelioration, of the negative consequences of the municipality’s activities and outputs on the 
economy, society and the environment and the capitals that they use and affect.263 Conversely, 
effective leadership is results-driven. It involves the achievement of strategic objectives and 
positive outcomes.264 Effective leadership includes, but also goes beyond, an internal focus on 
effective and efficient implementation.265 King IV notes that in order for the council to offer 
effective leadership, it must itself embody the ethical characteristics mentioned above.266 King 
IV, therefore, requires that members of the council, individually and collectively, cultivate 
these characteristics and exhibit them in their conduct. In this way, King IV complements 
section 195(1)(a) of the Constitution which requires that a high standard of professional ethics 
be promoted and maintained.267 This raises the question of how ethical leadership can be 
promoted in municipalities. 
 
The traditional approach of fostering ethical leadership is by way of enforcing codes of 
conduct, conducting ethical training and establishing the ethics committee.268 This is the 
approach that has been adopted in the South African local government. For example and as 
discussed in paragraph 3.1 of Chapter 3, the Code of Conduct for Councillors provides that 
councillors should perform their functions in good faith, honestly, transparently, in the best 
interests of the municipality and without compromising the municipality’s credibility or 
integrity.269 In Kannaland Municipality v Minister for Local Government, Environmental 
Affairs and Developmental Planning in the Western Cape and Another270 the court found that 
councillors continue to conduct their responsibilities in an unethical manner despite the 
presence of these mechanisms.271 It is therefore argued that these mechanisms can only be 
effective in maintaining an ethical culture in municipalities, not in creating ethical leadership 
itself. While ethics can be taught, integrity, responsibility and fairness develop overtime. A 
two-day course or even a university module is unlikely to radically change a person’s ethical 
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conduct. Ethical leaders are groomed. Instead of investing resources in ethics education for 
councillors with tainted background it is better for political parties to nominate or field 
candidates whom they have sufficient reason to believe that are ethical and effective. Prior to 
their nomination, thorough background checks should thus be conducted to determine whether 
or not the candidate has previously been found guilty of any misconduct. It should follow that 
candidates that are found to have engaged in, and who are found to be guilty of, misconduct 
should not be nominated as potential councillors. If political parties continue to field candidates 
with questionable morals, as has been the case for a while, then they run the risk of losing votes 
in the next local government elections. 
 
Principle 2 of King IV states that the council should govern the ethics of the municipality in a 
way that supports the establishment of an ethical culture.272 An ethical culture is one in which 
ethical behaviours are insisted upon and rewarded, but also one in which the ability to question 
and challenge decisions and actions is entrenched.273 The council should assume responsibility 
for the governance of ethics by setting the direction for how ethics should be approached and 
addressed by the organisation.274 As a point of departure, an ethical culture is dependent on 
ethical and effective leadership as exemplified by the council. This is supported by a study 
conducted which found that 75 per cent of the 8 000 respondents agreed that the organisation’s 
leader plays the most important role in establishing ethical standards for the organisation.275 
Brown, Trevino and Harrison thus provide that leaders should demonstrate normatively 
appropriate conduct through personal actions and interpersonal relationships and by promoting 
such conduct to followers through communication, reinforcement and decision-making.276 In 
this way, the council should communicate ethical expectations through formal processes such 
as the Code of Conduct for Staff as set out in Schedule 2 of the MSA. In addition to this, the 
council should ensure that thorough background checks are conducted in the recruitment and 
selection process to ensure that positions are filled with ethical employees. An ethical culture 
should further be maintained through effective ethics management. This requires that, inter 
alia, the council adopt whistle-blowing and ethics policies and put in place complaint 
mechanisms to ensure that any unethical conduct can be reported and acted on accordingly. 
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3.2 Calibre of councillors 
A discussion on effective leadership in municipalities is not complete without discussing the 
calibre of councillors. According to Statistics South Africa, a major problem in South Africa 
is that councillors cannot apply their minds to the documents of a municipality.277 Educational, 
skills and experience requirements do not form part of the eligibility criteria for the position of 
councillor.278 The result is that most people occupying the positios of a councillor are incapable 
of discharging their duties effectively, including, holding the executive accountable. It should 
thus be noted that this is one area where King IV sets a higher standard than provided for in 
law.279  King IV recognises the importance of capacity of councillors for the effective discharge 
of political functions in a municipality. Principle 7 of King IV states that the council should 
comprise the appropriate280 balance of knowledge, skills, experience, diversity and 
independence for it to discharge its governance role and responsibilities objectively.281 King 
IV is setting the record straight that the calibre of councillors that compose a council is critical 
for improving the performance of the council.282 Knowledge and skills speak to educational 
qualifications, educational seminars relevant to local government, training workshops that are 
aimed at building capacity in local government as well as qualification through long-term 
practical experience. Experience refers to the experience that is necessary for the successful 
execution of a councillor’s functions and powers. This may require diversity in experience such 
as law, accounting, human resource management or public administration. In addition, given 
the increasingly digital environment in which municipalities operate, having a technology 
expert on council could be a strategic advantage for the municipality.283  
 
Further, principle 7 of King IV requires that elected councillors are diverse and independent. 
Diversity implies that the council should comprise of members who have a diverse set of skills, 
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knowledge and experience but of different age grouping, cultural background and gender, 
among other differences.284 This would result in the local community being better represented 
on the council as it allows for enhanced representation of different interest groups. This is 
confirmed by research which revealed that diverse groups outperformed homogeneous (that is, 
groups of the same like) groups because the diverse group more carefully evaluated the 
information at hand which was absent from a homogeneous group.285 Another study confirmed 
that after the introduction of a 40 per cent gender quota in the directors’ post, it was found that 
female directors are ‘more likely than their male counterparts to probe deeply into the issues at 
hand’ by asking more questions, leading to more robust deliberations.286 It is arguable, 
therefore, that from a diverse council would flow various views that result in positive 
interaction and yield results in decision-making that represents the interests of all stakeholders.  
 
Independence refers to the exercise of objective, unfettered judgement.287 In Law Society of 
South Africa and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others,288 the court 
stressed that public powers must always be exercised within the constitutional bounds and in 
the best interest of the people.289 Therefore, in order for councillors to be deemed as being 
independent, councillors should exercise their judgement in the interest of the local community. 
It may  be difficult for councillors to be ‘independent’ if they belong to a political party that 
determines policy positions to be taken in the council. However, the argument is advanced that 
when political parties formulate a policy, all of its members, including those who will serve on 
the council should participate in the policy formation process. In this regard, a councillor will 
be dependent on, and should be guided by, the information pertaining to the policies already 
agreed upon but the basis on which conclusions are drawn by such a councillor should be 
independent.  
In terms of the above, King IV recommends the following: that political parties should deploy 
councillors with the necessary skills, knowledge, and experience to ensure that they are able to 
perform their functions diligently.290 The above recommendation, however, excludes 
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independent councillors. An independent councillor refers to a councillor who was not 
nominated by a party as a candidate.291 Thus a political party will not be able to ensure that 
independent councillors comply with the above criteria as independent candidates are 
nominated by members of the community. In this regard, it appears that King IV is not 
sufficient in that it does not make mention of the position of independent councillors and how 
these principles may apply to them  
 
King IV also recommends that a strong emphasis be put on in-depth induction for newly elected 
councillors at the start of a new political term in the interest of bolstering knowledge on the 
council.292 The council should further ensure the establishment of professional education 
programmes for councillors that run for the full term of office to ensure the building of 
competence.293 It is, however, possible for councillors who possess the required skills, 
knowledge, and experience to not perform adequately once they are in office. Attached to this 
requirement should thus be the duty to exercise their functions with the reasonable care, skill, 
and diligence294 that would be expected by a person carrying out the same functions as that of 
a councillor. This provides for a performance standard to which underperforming councillors 
conduct could be tested to ascertain whether or not there is merit to sanction that councillor for 
his or her performance. This would ensure that skilled, knowledgeable, and experienced 
councillors further perform their functions according to standard and can be held accountable 
for any substandard performance when they are elected into office.  
 
3.3 Reporting for accountability purposes 
Reporting is a critical function without which accountability will be difficult to establish. 
Regular reporting can provide useful information which enables other stakeholders to 
undertake their role such as oversight. Reporting is also essential for the local community as it 
provides them with information relating to, and serves as a guide on, the utilisation of public 
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funds and the performance of a municipality.295 It is for this reason that legislation imposes 
reporting obligations on municipalities in South Africa.  
 
Municipalities are required to produce monthly, quarterly, and annual reports which focus on, 
among others, their performance against the municipal budget and against service delivery 
plans. For example, section 71(1) of the MFMA requires that the accounting officer of a 
municipality submit monthly reports, to the mayor and the relevant provincial treasury. The 
report should illustrate the state of the municipality’s budget reflecting all relevant particulars 
(such as the actual revenue, per revenue source, actual borrowings, actual expenditure per vote, 
actual capital expenditure per vote, the amount of any allocations received, the actual 
expenditure on those allocations, etc)for that month and for the financial year up to the end of 
that month.296 Councillors are required to report to local communities at least quarterly on 
council matters, including the performance of the municipality against established 
indicators.297 Section 121(2)(b) of the MFMA also requires municipalities to submit annual 
reports to the AGSA, the relevant provincial treasury and the provincial department responsible 
for local government in the province.298 Apart from these reporting functions, there is also a 
general reporting obligation which requires the accounting officer of a municipality to submit 
to the National Treasury, the provincial treasury, the department for local government in the 
province or the AGSA information, returns, documents, explanations, and motivations as may 
be prescribed or required.299 King IV recognises the importance of reporting to enable the 
various accountability mechanisms to take effect. Principle 5 of King IV requires that the 
council ensure that reports that are issued by the municipality enable stakeholders to make 
informed assessments of the municipality’s performance and its short, medium- and long-term 
prospects. This calls for reporting beyond mere compliance or the check-box approach. The 
King IV Report does not only recognise the need for municipalities to report on their activities 
but also the need for such reports to be presented in a manner that enables stakeholders to easily 
assess the performance of a municipality. King IV defines these stakeholders as: 
 
 ‘The groups or individuals that can reasonably be expected to be significantly affected 
by a municipality’s activities, outputs or outcomes, or whose actions can reasonably be 
                                                          
295 Kwame A ‘Can Reporting of Local Government Performance Enhance Citizens’ Engagement?’ (2015) 44(4) 
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expected to significantly affect the ability of the municipality to create value over 
time’.300  
 
The MSA provides that a municipality consists of the political structures and the administration 
of a municipality as well as the local community of that municipality.301 The Constitution 
requires local government to provide democratic and accountable government to local 
communities.302 Thus, there is no doubt that the local community is the primary stakeholder of 
a municipality. Other important stakeholders are however national and provincial governments, 
NGOs and the AGSA, among others. 
 
Besides the issue of stakeholders, another critical element of principle 5 relates to the kind of 
information provided by these reports. In words, does a report present information in a manner 
which allows the relevant stakeholder to make sense of it? It can be argued that the easy 
assessment of municipal performance is likely to be enhanced if the following conditions are 
met: the timeous publication of reports, the presentation of factual information and the 
presentation of information in a manner which is easy to understand. While the first two 
conditions are regulated, the last one is arguably not. Even with such regulation some 
municipalities still fail to provide factual information on time. This was revealed by the 
AGSA’s audit report for the 2016-17 financial year which established that performance reports 
of 62 per cent of the municipalities had material flaws and were not credible enough for the 
council or for public use.303 Without credible information, it would be difficult for the local 
leadership to make sense of where they are going wrong and to institute corrective measures 
where necessary. Similarly, it would be difficult for stakeholders to evaluate the performance 
of the municipality and to make informed decisions in holding local government accountable. 
The result is that accountability cannot be effectively enforced. 
 
In The President of the Republic of South Africa and Others v M & G Media Ltd 2011 (2) SA 
1 (SCA), Sachs J correctly stated that: 
 
 ‘Open and transparent government and a free flow of information concerning the 
affairs of the state is the lifeblood of democracy. It is impossible to hold a (local) 
government accountable that operates in secrecy’.304  
                                                          
300 King IV (2016) 17. 
301 MSA s2(b)(i)-(ii). 
302 Constitution (1996) s152(1)(a). 
303 Auditor-General of South Africa (2017) 14.  
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Therefore, to ensure that reports produced by a municipality meet the objective of enabling 
stakeholders to make informed assessments of the municipality’s performance, such reports 
must be of adequate quality yet easy to read and comprehend. This means that the information 
provided should be presented in such a manner that enables an average citizen to read and 
understand. This can be achieved by, instead of providing long and complicated reports as 
required by legislation (budgets, annual reports etc.), compiling shorter and simplified versions 
of such reports for the consumption of the local community (a citizens’ guide, citizen’s budget 
etc). In addition to this, these reports should be published on a municipality’s website for public 
consumption. Participation structures, including ward committees, can be utilised to distribute 
these public-friendly reports or documents to those who are not able to access the website. 
Thus, principle 5 has brought another dimension to reporting for accountability purposes which 
is not adequately covered by legislation. 
  
3.4 Measuring the performance of political actors and structures 
There is no doubt that performance evaluation should be part of interventions designed to 
improve municipal governance. It seeks to monitor an individual or department’s progress and 
success against a municipality’s strategic objectives and its financial capacity.305 Performance 
evaluation can be effective in detecting any poor performance and to improve such 
performance while simultaneously ensuring accountability for substandard performance.306 
King IV recognises the importance of performance evaluation in ensuring an effective system 
of local government. Principle 9 of King IV provides that the council should ensure that the 
evaluation of its own performance and that of its committees, its speaker and individual 
councillors, facilitate the continuous improvement of their performance and effectiveness.307 
This is not a new requirement as the MSA states that a municipality must establish a 
performance management system308 in order to promote a culture of performance among its 
political structures, political office bearers, councillors and in its administration.309 Section 
19(2) of the Municipal Structures Act also provides that the council must annually review the 
needs of the community, its priorities to meet those needs, its processes for involving the 
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community and its organisational and delivery mechanisms for meeting the needs of the 
community.310 In addition to this, the council is required to review its (the council’s) overall 
performance in achieving these objectives.311 However, King IV demands a higher standard of 
performance evaluation by encouraging closer collaboration between the council and political 
parties on the manner and form in which the performance of councillors, the speaker, the mayor 
and council, at large, should be assessed.312  
 
King IV further requires that the results of the performance evaluations of the council, its 
committees, speaker and individual councillors be responded to by the council as to achieve 
continuous improvement in its performance and effectiveness.313 This should be done to 
provide the councillors with an opportunity to provide reasons for any poor performance and 
to receive guidance, assistance or training in this regard to promote continuous improvement 
in their performance. It is submitted that where performance evaluation reveals any substandard 
performance, it should be responded to with appropriate sanctions as well. In this regard, 
unethical performance must be responded to by the Speaker of the council through enforcing 
the code of conduct against  the relevant councillor. In addition, poor performance must be 
punished in subsequent elections by the citizenry. However, as discussed in paragraph 3.6 of 
Chapter 3, the citizenry is unlikely to hold poor-performing councillors accountable at the polls, 
unless political choices are made on good government concerns and not on other 
considerations. In South Africa, due to its apartheid past, groups are still sharply divided along 
racial and ethnic lines. These divisions, along with the strong mistrust by non-whites that came 
about as a result of apartheid, have led to groups supporting political parties consisting, mostly, 
of members from their own race or ethnicity.314 Therefore, loyalty to political parties is still, 
unfortunately, one of the key considerations when individuals decide who to vote for.   
In the most extreme case, that is where performance evaluations reveal continued substandard 
performance, such councillors should be deemed as unfit to hold office. Consequently, he or 
she should be removed from office and replaced by a candidate that possess the necessary 
skills, knowledge, and experience to perform the functions of that office effectively. This is 
where the role of political parties comes in to recall or replace their members who have a proven 
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track record of substandard performance.315 Thus, King IV is calling for closer collaboration 
between the council and political parties around performance evaluation of political office 
bearers.  
 
The challenge, once again, comes with independent councillors whose performance should also 
be evaluated, like any other councillors. With regard to independent councillors, only their 
constituency can hold them accountable during elections. The fact that they are very few 
independent councillors means that political parties nonetheless still have a very important role 
to play in holding their representatives in councils for their performance. 
 
3.5 The importance of rule of the law to accountable local government  
Chapter 3 paragraph 4 demonstrated that municipalities are failing partially due to material 
non-compliance and non-implementation of laws and regulations that are applicable to local 
government. The failure on the part of council to ensure compliance with material legislation 
in municipalities has partially resulted in accountability being weakened.316 The rule of law is 
important as it is the mechanism through which other stakeholders can lawfully hold officials 
answerable for their actions (or the lack thereof). Compliance with the rule of law is important 
to ensure good governance in municipalities by, for instance, ensuring prudent spending of 
public funds. King IV has set the record straight that there cannot be accountability at the local 
level without the rule of the law. Principle 13 of King IV states that ‘the council should govern 
compliance with applicable laws, non-binding rules, codes and standards in a way that 
supports the municipality being an ethical and good corporate citizen’.317 This principle raises 
several questions that are critical to improving accountability in local government.  
 
 The MSA provides that the municipal manager is responsible and accountable for, inter alia, 
the management of the municipality’s administration in accordance with applicable 
legislation.318 However, King IV places the responsibility to govern (that is to control, 
influence or regulate) compliance with legislation, rules, codes and standards on the council 
                                                          
315 This is plausible in the context of councillors that are elected through proportional representation. However, 
with regards to ward councillors (that is, those that are directly elected to represent and serve the people of a 
specific ward) it becomes difficult. The only recourse available in this instance is for the constituency to hold 
them accountable at the polls for substandard performance.  
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and not on the municipal manager. The reasoning behind this is that it is the council and not 
the municipal manager, that is ultimately accountable to citizens and other stakeholders. 
However, given that the municipal manager is appointed by and accountable to the council a 
closer collaboration between the two is expected to ensure effective compliance. 
 
King IV has also moved away from the common belief that the rule of law is merely about 
complying with applicable legislation. It emphasises that municipalities should also respect 
and implement non-binding rules, standards, and codes. Non-binding rules refer to rules that 
the municipality adheres to on a voluntary basis such as best practices for reporting, disclosure, 
or governance. Codes present standards of conduct expected of municipal officials, including 
the council. In this way, the code exemplifies the core professional values and behaviours 
underpinning the most encountered ethical considerations, as discussed above.319 Therefore, 
put simply, codes refer to policies that are related to conduct and discipline. For example, Codes 
of Conduct and codes of best practices such as the United Nations Global Compact Principles 
which is derived from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Labour 
Organisation’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development, and the United Nations Convention Against Corruption.320 
Compliance with these codes, therefore, put municipalities in a position to operate in a manner 
that enables them to meet international obligations in the areas of human rights, labour, 
environment and anti-corruption. Standards are aimed at achieving the optimum degree of 
order in a given context through establishing specifications and procedures that should be 
complied with when decisions are taken321 Standards are necessary to ensure, for example, that 
a document is of reasonable quality, accuracy and verifiability. Examples of standards include, 
the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board’s International Engagement 
Standards that assurance services are required to comply with. Another example is the 
requirement by the National Treasury that municipalities financial statements are compliant 
with the Generally Recognised Accounting Practice (GRAP) standard.322 
The last important aspect of principle 13 is that compliance with the rule of law is not an end 
in itself. It should lead to a ‘municipality being an ethical and good corporate citizen’. Good 
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corporate citizenship requires that the council view a municipality as an integral part of the 
broader society in which it operates.323 The municipality is afforded standing as a juristic 
person in a society with rights and corresponding responsibilities.324 It is, therefore, necessary 
that the council consider not only the performance of a municipality but also the impact of a 
municipality’s operations on society and the environment. As a responsible corporate citizen, 
the council should ensure that the municipality protects, enhance, and invest in the well-being 
of the economy, society, and the environment. In Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry v 
Stilfontein Gold Mining Company325 the court noted that one of the characteristics of good 
governance is social responsibility and accordingly held that the relevant respondents acted 
irresponsibly by not addressing the issue of water pollution in exercising its decision.326 
Therefore, compliance should be governed to ensure that stakeholders view the municipality 
as doing the right thing (by achieving their objectives) whilst protecting, enhancing and 
investing in the well-being of the economy, society and the environment. 
 
3.6 The importance of internal oversight 
In paragraph 3.4 of Chapter 3 it was observed that internal oversight structures can be effective 
in promoting accountability in municipalities. This is recognised by principle 15 of King IV 
which requires the council to ensure that assurance services and functions enable an effective 
control environment and that these support the integrity of information for internal decision-
making and of the municipality’s external reports.327 What are these assurance services and 
functions? How are they important to ensure an effective control environment? Assurance 
services include, but are not limited to, assurance engagements performed by independent, 
internal or external assurance service providers (such as an internal audit unit or the AGSA). 
Assurance services are required to provide, by way of reporting, a conclusion designed to 
enhance the degree of confidence of the intended users other than the responsible party about 
the outcome of the evaluation or measurement of a subject matter against criteria.328 Assurance 
functions includes, inter alia, the municipality’s line functions that own and manage risks and 
the municipality’s specialist functions that facilitate and oversee risk management and 
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compliance.329 In local government, structures that perform these functions include MPACs, 
internal audit units and audit committees. Therefore, legislation adequately provides for 
assurance services and functions in municipalities.330 
 
A control environment refers to the set of standards, processes and structures that provide the 
basis for carrying out internal control331 in a municipality. Effective control is achieved through 
strengthened internal controls and monitoring systems that are effective to, inter alia: safeguard 
the assets of the municipality; ensure that information received and provided is accurate and 
reliable; resources are utilised to promote effective, economic and efficient delivery of services 
and; ensure that management policies and procedures are implemented and followed 
religiously. According to the Institute of Internal Auditors, an effective control environment is 
characterised by the following elements: integrity and ethical values, effective management, 
competent personnel and, adherence to policies and practices.332 Therefore, in this context, the 
function of assurance services in municipalities should be to assess and identify potential risks 
that may result in the failure of any of the elements of a controlled environment. An effective 
control environment should be able to detect and reduce opportunities for maladministration, 
corruption, and resource wastage in a municipality. 
 
As observed in paragraph 3.3 of Chapter 3, legislation provides for assurance services and 
functions such as internal audit units and MPACs.333 King IV is emphasising that these internal 
oversight structures must exercise their functions to ensure the integrity of information 
(information-integrity). Information-integrity refers to the trustworthiness and dependability of 
the information.334 More specifically, it refers to information that is reliable, accurate, and 
credible. Legislation makes adequate provision for this. The capacity of these structures to 
undertake their role including producing reliable information, therefore, becomes crucial. 
Principle 15 directs the council to ensure that these assurance structures live up to their potential 
by fulfilling the above objectives. It should thus be the primary role of every council to ensure 
that these assurance providers are effective. The council should ensure, among other things, 
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that assurance providers have a clear mandate and know what is expected of them; members 
of assurance structures are properly qualified to execute their functions diligently; have access 
to required information which they receive within strict timeframes, and that those assurance 
providers are adequately resourced. Furthermore, in Chapter 3 it was demonstrated that internal 
oversight structures are ineffective in promoting accountability in municipalities partially due 
to the fact that their recommendations are often not implemented or adhered to in 
municipalities.335 Thus, it becomes important that the council ensure that the feedback received 
from assurance services is taken seriously, that their recommendations are duly implemented 
and that sanctions are enforced where so required.  
 
3.7 Stakeholder participation 
Stakeholder participation in local government is essential to provide all interested stakeholders 
with full opportunities to share concerns, views, influence decision-making, build their 
commitment to the participatory process, ensure implementation of adopted measures and to 
ensure the sustainability of plans and decisions.336 However, in practice, it is estimated that less 
than 3 per cent of the national population have actually participated in the affairs of 
municipalities.337 This is so despite the MSA as well as the Constitution requiring that the 
council of a municipality involve the local community in the affairs of the municipality.338 
King IV seeks to address this gap. Principle 16 of King IV provides that in the execution of its 
governance role and responsibilities, the council should adopt a stakeholder-inclusive approach 
that balances the needs, interests, and expectations of material stakeholders339 in the best 
interest of the municipality over time. King IV recognises that a municipality does not function 
in isolation but in relation with other stakeholders. Material stakeholders refer to any group 
that is directly affected by a municipality’s operations or whose role has direct implications on 
a municipality’s operations. As mentioned above, the primary stakeholder of a municipality is 
its local community. The MSA defines a local community as: 
 ‘That body of persons comprising: residents of the municipality; ratepayers of the 
municipality; civic organisations and non-governmental, private sector or labour 
organisations or bodies that are involved in the affairs of the municipality; visitors and 
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other people residing outside the municipality who, because of their presence in the 
municipality, make use of services or facilities provided by the municipality’.340  
 
The ‘residents’ referred to in this section include, among others, the youth, women, disabled 
people, pensioners and other marginalised groups. A stakeholder-inclusive approach would, 
therefore, require that the municipality also takes into account the needs of such groups who 
are residents within that municipality’s jurisdiction.  
 
Besides the local community, other material stakeholders include the private sector, NGOs,  
national and provincial governments, including, bulk services providers, such as ESKOM and 
water boards. Therefore, it is necessary that a municipality consider all the interests of its 
different stakeholders. The stakeholder-inclusive approach recognises that a municipality has 
many stakeholders that may negatively affect a municipality to achieve its strategy and long-
term sustained growth.341 This is supported by Freeman who provides that an organisation 
cannot survive without the support of its stakeholders.342 In terms of this approach, the 
legitimate interests and expectations of stakeholders should be considered when the council 
makes decisions.343 An interest or expectation is deemed to be legitimate if a reasonable and 
informed outsider would conclude it to be valid and justifiable in the circumstances on a legal, 
moral or ethical basis.344 This approach, therefore, demands that the interests of a municipality 
extend to include that of other material stakeholders. This principle of King IV calls for the 
need for a council to have a legal duty to balance the interests of the municipality and its 
material stakeholders when it makes decisions that may adversely affect any of their material 
stakeholders. Further, principle 16 also requires a balancing of interests in the ‘best interest of 
the municipality over time’. This means that the municipality’s interests ought to retain 
primacy. Therefore, the council should prioritise the interests of other material stakeholders 
only if this is likely to promote the success of the municipality over time. This is necessary to 
ensure that municipalities would continue to deliver quality services in future.  
 
Every council should, therefore, identify the material stakeholders of the municipality, their 
interests and expectations and align these with the municipality’s strategic objectives. The 
starting point is for the council to ensure the implementation of processes aimed at promoting 
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appropriate disclosure of these interests and expectations.345 The council should then ensure 
that its management develops, for adoption by the council, a strategy and stakeholder 
engagement policies for the regulation of the municipality’s relationships with all its 
stakeholders.346 This process requires active and regular communication with the relevant 
stakeholders. 
 
4 CONCLUSION  
This chapter discussed the utility of selected King IV Principles on Corporate Governance in 
improving accountability in local government. It was established that the principles have the 
potential to improve accountability in municipalities if incorporated sufficiently in municipal 
governance. The chapter demonstrated that ethical and effective leadership forms the basis on 
which all principles of King IV rests. Therefore, ethical, and effective leadership is an absolute 
requirement is a sine qua non for accountability in local government. Further, King IV seeks 
to improve accountability in municipalities by providing recommended practices that set the 
bar higher than what is required by local government legislation. For example, among the 
concrete practices recommended by King IV which set a higher standard than the current laws 
and policies of local government, is the requirement that the council should comprise the 
appropriate347 balance of knowledge, skills, experience, diversity and independence for it to 
discharge its governance role and responsibilities objectively.348 In this way, the principles 
complement the existing legislation. In other cases, King IV Principles fill certain gaps in the 
law which have created accountability challenges in local government. King IV places the 
obligation to implement its principles squarely on the council as it is ultimately accountable for 
any poor performance. Moreover, the council is the highest decision-making body of a 
municipality vested with all the legislative and executive powers. Thus, there is no doubt that 
any measures designed to improve municipal accountability should target the council and 
spearheaded by the council to promote ownership. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
1 INTRODUCTION  
South Africa has one of the most advanced systems of local government in terms of institutions 
and legislation. The Constitution empowers local governments with specific functions and 
powers (legislative, executive, and revenue-raising) to ensure that local governments are 
responsive and accountable. The Constitution and legislation provide a variety of mechanisms 
(institutional and procedural) at both vertical and horizontal levels to ensure that local 
government is held accountable. However, despite these mechanisms, evidence suggests that 
accountability continues to fail in local government. This means that the current accountability 
mechanisms that are in place are ineffective and/or inadequate. The result is that, instead of 
local government being accountable, responsive, and responsible, it is often perceived as a 
sphere of government that is primarily to blame for poor service delivery owing to factors such 
as corruption, maladministration, and resource wastage.  
 
There is no doubt that if local government fails due to weaknesses in accountability, public 
service delivery will also fail given that municipalities are the core-face of service delivery in 
South Africa. This makes urgent interventions to enhance the effectiveness or complement the 
existing accountability mechanisms crucial to ensure that local government remains 
accountable. The primary objective of this paper was to understand the problems associated 
with accountability in municipalities and explore ways in which they can be addressed. 
Towards this end, the paper explored the utility of the King IV Principles in addressing some 
of these problems. Due to word count limitations applicable for a research paper, only the 
application of selected principles that are likely to have a direct impact on accountability were 
discussed, instead of all the 16 principles. The purpose of this chapter is to provide major 
findings and conclusions of the study. 
 
2 FINDINGS OF THE STUDY 
2.1 Accountability is important if local government is to be effective 
Chapter 2 sought to establish the significance of accountability to an effective system of local 
government. It commenced by briefly analysing the potential of decentralisation and the 
ingredients that are necessary for local government to live up to its potential. It was established 
that while local government has significant potential with regard to the realisation of 
democracy, development, and peace, among other objectives, it is unlikely to deliver on such 
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objectives unless it is accountable.349 This finding is not new in academic literature. It resonates 
with scholars, such as Ribot and Agrawal, who argue that if powers and resources are 
decentralised to local actors who are not accountable to their constituents or who are 
accountable only to themselves, then decentralisation is not likely to accomplish its stated 
aims.350 Therefore, accountability is necessary for local government to live up to its potential. 
Where local governments are not accountable, decentralisation will likely promote, among 
other ills, corruption, and resource wastage.  
 
2.2 The state of accountability in South African local government is poor 
Having established that local governments are unlikely to be effective unless they are 
accountable, Chapter 3 sought to examine whether South Africa has accountability 
mechanisms in place to ensure that local government is accountable and if so, whether they are 
effective in practice? If not, what are the challenges that are hampering their effectiveness? The 
paper established that there are a variety of mechanisms that are in place to ensure that local 
government remains accountable. These include Codes of Conduct for Councillors and Staff, 
performance agreements, the intervention powers of the national and provincial governments, 
the role of the AGSA and local elections. As indicated above, evidence, however, suggests that 
the accountability architecture is wholly ineffective in practice. For instance, while empowered 
with significant supervisory powers, the national and provincial governments have not been 
effective in ensuring that municipalities are accountable. The high number of service delivery 
protests351 suggests that citizens have abandoned formal mechanisms of communicating their 
grievances and holding municipal officials accountable. Thus, there is no doubt that 
accountability in municipalities continues to fail. 
 
2.3 King IV is useful in addressing accountability weaknesses in municipalities  
In paragraph 3 of Chapter 2, it was stated that accountability has five different dimensions 
namely, transparency, liability, controllability, responsibility and responsiveness. After 
analysing King IV, it can be concluded that eight of the 16 principles that were selected for the 
purposes of this paper are likely to cater to these dimensions of accountability once 
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incorporated by municipalities. King IV seeks to address major issues that have resulted in 
accountability collapses in municipalities. Its principles emphasise, among other things, the 
importance of ethics, leadership, transparency, oversight, skills, and the rule of the law. These 
essential ingredients enable the council to effectively guard against and eradicate the exercise 
of functions in an arbitrary fashion, gross negligence and bad faith that have become common 
practice in most municipalities. Therefore, there is no doubt that all these ingredients are central 
to entrenching a culture of accountability in municipalities. The study found that of the eight 
selected principles of King IV that was examined here, it is only principle 7 of King IV that 
demands a higher standard than provided in local government law and policies.352 The rest of 
the principles are nonetheless useful in that they supplement the existing legislation and 
policies through incorporating the recommended practices provided in King IV in this regard.  
King IV seeks to change the belief that municipalities, by virtue of being public bodies, cannot 
be administered in a way private sector companies are run. By developing a set of 16 principles 
on corporate governance specifically for municipalities, King IV demonstrates that the concept 
of corporate governance, rooted traditionally in the private sector, has equal application in the 
municipalities.  
2.4 King IV Principles can be implemented within the current legislative framework 
One of the key attributes of King IV is that it prescribes higher standards of governance than 
what is ordinarily provided for by legislation. The study found that while King IV mentions 
that its principles set a higher standard of governance than provided in local government 
legislation, this study only found that to be the case in relation to principle 7 of King IV. All 
other principles that were examined can be reconciled with and supplement existing legislation. 
It would, however, be in the best interest of the municipality as well as its stakeholders to 
comply with the higher standard of governance as set out in principle 7 of King IV in order to 
address accountability weaknesses in municipalities. Principle 7 of King IV may, however, be 
difficult to implement within the current legislative framework. As stated above, the principle 
requires that the council to be composed by individuals who possess a diversity of knowledge, 
skills, and experience, which is currently not a legislative requirement for the position of 
councillor. This principle can, however, be implemented by political parties when nominating 
or selecting candidates to stand as councillors so that the challenges surrounding the inability 
of most councillors to undertake their functions effectively can be addressed. This may enhance 
                                                          
352 See n 270 above. 
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the ability of councils, its committees, and individual councillors in undertaking their 
respective roles, including the oversight function which is the centre of accountability. 
 
2.5 There is a need for gradual implementation of King IV Principles 
While the King IV Principles apply to all types of municipalities, it may nonetheless be difficult 
for poorer municipalities, that lack the capacity, to implement these principles. For example, 
the establishment of professional education programmes for councillors that run for the full 
term of office to ensure the continuous building of competence on council for purposes of 
principle 7 of King IV can be a costly process. However, the benefit it offers such as an 
effective municipal council capable of holding its executive accountable, far outweigh the costs 
involved. It is, thus, recommended that poorer municipalities should adopt an approach that 
seeks to gradually and over time incorporate the principles. It would be useful for those 
municipalities to reflect on which principles should be prioritised over the others. The national 
and provincial governments can also provide the required support to these weak municipalities 
to enhance their capacity to incorporate King IV Principles in their governance. Metropolitan 
municipalities and some of the secondary cities, however, do have the means to implement all 
the discussed principles of King IV (and others that were not selected for the purposes of this 
paper) as they have the capacity to implement them. There is thus no need for them to gradually 
incorporate these principles over time. In fact, some of these municipalities, such as the City 
of Cape Town, are already implementing certain principles of King IV directly or indirectly. 
 
2.6 Accountability is unlikely to improve unless the issue of ethics and leadership is 
addressed 
King IV recognises the important role of council as the highest governing body of a 
municipality. It is the body that must be held accountable by the public and senior government 
for the affairs of a municipality. It is for this reason that the obligation to implement all the 
principles of King IV that are applicable to municipalities falls squarely on the council. It, 
therefore, becomes important that members that constitute the council are fit and proper for 
their purpose. This primarily requires that councillors are ethical and effective. Importantly, 
the study found that mere ethical management will not be sufficient to establish ethical 
leadership in municipalities. The starting point should be that only capable officials (both 
political and administrative) that possess the required ethical standards are elected into office 
and appointed into positions. Without ethical leadership it is unlikely that any intervention, 
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whether legislative or otherwise, will change the poor state of accountability in municipalities. 
There is thus no doubt that ethical and effective leadership is an absolute requirement for 
accountability issues to be resolved in municipalities.  
 
3 CONCLUSION 
Local government is at the centre of state delivery in South Africa as it is mandated to provide 
major basic services that have a direct impact on citizens’ well-being. Practice, however, 
indicates that local government is failing to deliver on its demanding obligations. One of the 
reasons behind this failure, identified by the AGSA, among other institutions, is weaknesses in 
accountability. This suggests that accountability mechanisms that are in place are ineffective 
or inadequate. This study established that the incorporation of the King IV Principles can help 
arrest some of the accountability challenges. The King IV Principles have the potential to 
establish an effective control environment that is essential to mitigate risks that have arisen in 
municipalities and which have been detrimental to the municipalities and various stakeholders. 
King IV provides for a range of advantages that municipalities can benefit from, such as 
improved performance; integrated, simplified and quality reporting; commitment to 
stakeholder engagement; and council effectiveness. King IV places the obligation to implement 
its 16 principles designed to improve municipal governance on the municipal council. This is 
in recognition of the constitutional position that the council is the highest decision-making 
body of a municipality vested with all the legislative and executive powers of a municipality. 
For the council to effectively deliver on its role, King IV emphasises the importance of ethics, 
leadership, skills and experience in municipalities, particularly the council. This requires a 
rethink of the way in which local officials are elected into office, how they are appointed into 
certain positions, how their performance is evaluated, and how sanctions are enforced for poor 
performance and misconduct. Legislative interventions alone will clearly not solve the 
accountability challenges in municipalities. What is required is a combined effort from 
municipalities (both political administrative and administrative structures); national and 
provincial governments; independent institutions, such as the AGSA; political parties; and the 
general citizenry.  
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